About János Martonyi, the new Hungarian foreign minister

Almost every time there is an opinion piece about the future of Hungarian foreign policy, commentators feel compelled to mention that János Martonyi is practically the only  minister of the second Orbán government who knows his business.

This is not a new phenomenon. I clearly remember that the failures of the first Orbán government in the field of diplomacy were usually chalked up to the inexperience of the prime minister and the nationalistic impulses of Martonyi's undersecretary, the aggressive Zsolt Németh. However, Martonyi protested even then when a reporter pointed out the general impression that he and Viktor Orbán held different views on Hungarian foreign policy. I'm sure that no one really believed his protestations because, after all, he was supposed to be a real expert. I was also inclined to think that Martonyi with all his experience couldn't have made so many mistakes and wondered why he remained in his post. Why didn't he quit if he didn't have a free hand?

In the last few days I have changed my mind. I have come to the conclusion that Martonyi was and will be a lousy foreign minister. He was not a puppet as so many of us believed. He really was in charge and in perfect harmony with the views of Viktor Orbán and Zsolt Németh.

Let me say a few words about him and his family. János Martonyi, Sr. was a law professor whose family name was Martin until 1931, when at the age of 21 he Hungarianized his name to Martonyi. He was a brilliant scholar who worked as a civil servant before he taught law at the University of Szeged. In October 1940, shortly after Hungary received northern Transylvania thanks to the Second Vienna Award, Martonyi Sr. moved to Kolozsvár (Cluj) to the old/new Hungarian university there. It was here that János Martonyi, Jr. was born in April 1944. Bad timing because the Martonyi family had to flee from Cluj within a few months. The city was occupied by the Russians, followed by the Romanians, in October 1944.

Martonyi's father's career didn't suffer as a result of his sojourn in Cluj. He returned to the University of Szeged where he became departmental head and twice served as dean of the law school. His son studied at the same institution, a practice I find a "bad practice." This way we really cannot tell whether his summa cum laude was well earned or whether he was treated differently because of the position of his father within the university. We do know, however, that he managed to learn four languages well: German, French, English, and Russian. For a while he worked as a legal counsel for a shipping company, but between 1979 and 1984 he served as commercial secretary at the Hungarian Embassy in Brussels. In 1985 he was named assistant undersecretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1989 he became deputy minister of the same ministry. His next job was commissioner in charge of privatization in Miklós Németh's government, the last government before the regime change. A lot of jokes are being cracked about Martonyi's bad timing because he decided to become a party member only a few months before the collapse of the Kádár regime.

Martonyi's rise might have been due in part to his alleged work as an informer between 1965 and 1986. In plain language, he spied on his colleagues and the foreigners he came in contact with. The first time his involvement with the network of informers came to light was in 2002 when the Mécs Committee was investigating the backgrounds of former government officials after it became known that Péter Medgyessy was employed as an officer by the counterintelligence section of the secret service. At that time Martonyi claimed that "he didn't sign any statement, didn't report on anyone, and didn't receive any remuneration."

However, a few years later, in 2007, thanks to the research of Péter Kende, it turned out that Martonyi was not as innocent as he claimed. Kende found out that Martonyi was in contact with the secret service between 1965 and 1986 with the cover names "Magasdi" and later "Marosvásárhelyi." His folder contains fifty pages of reports. Martonyi admitted that he did write "travel reports" and that he was familiar with these cover names. He even admitted that he gave these reports to the police. But he claimed that without writing these reports he couldn't have travelled abroad. Martonyi threatened a law suit if Kende's article that appeared in Élet és Irodalom wasn't to his liking. As far as I know no law suit followed.

Martonyi's career didn't suffer with the change of regime. His last-minute membership in the party wasn't an obstacle. In the Antall government (1990-1994) he served as permanent undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry and four years later Viktor Orbán picked him as his foreign minister. As for the embarrassing details of his long association with the secret service, it was no problem. A past connection with the secret service is problematic only if the person after the change of regime ended up "on the wrong side," that is, in MSZP, like Péter Medgyessy. But people like Zsigmond Járai or Imre Boross who served during the Orbán government were forgiven. "Our communists" are okay, "your communists" are certainly not. This is how it goes in Hungary.


  1. Dora: “There was a lawsuit… http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20080623/martonyi_pert_nyert_kende/
    Thank you. But if one reads the article it is clear that what Kende wrote was true. However, Hungarian law concerning the fate of these informers is such that it is practically impossible to win against a former informer. Krisztián Ungváry complained about this not long time ago. Or there was the case of Népszava v. Katalin Kondor. It was crystal clear that Kondor was an informer yet Népszava lost.

  2. Dear Balogh Eva,
    this is just a follow up email to see if you had had a chance to consider my question as of yet? I am sure you are a very busy person, so I hope I am not bothering you by asking you again.
    I attach my original email.
    I am a research student at the Universiteit van Amsterdam and am
    currently writing about the effects of external austerity
    programmes and if they give rise to political expressions of
    nationalism. I am using Hungary and South Korea as case studies.
    I have read many of your blogs on the Hungarian Spectrum and have found them to be most informative.
    I would like to ask you, as an expert in the field, if in your opinion
    the IMF-led austerity programme has incurred feelings of nationalism
    within Hungary, particularly with refernce to the Fidesz & Jobbik party and their campaigning for the 2010 election.
    Also, are there any other works, to your knowledge, which could aid me
    in any way?
    Any help you could give me would be very much appreciated.
    Yours sincerely,
    Samuel Rogers,
    Universiteit van Amsterdam
    P.s. I have read some of your other more recent articles, such as the one on Trianon. I find this very interesting and it may go some way to informing my thesis.

  3. Dear Samuel:
    I am not the intended addressee of your inquiry, it is true and I am sure Eva will get back to you with lots of helpful materials. But in the meantime I would like to point out two facts.
    First, the IMF contribution was a voluntarily chosen solution of the Hungarian Government and the IMF didn’t need to impose anything, since the Hungarians already were in the process of an austerity drive that undoubtedly made the IMF more agreeable towards them.
    The other is that although the ultra,- and general right is completely against everything that is foreign, in this case the IMF, and it wasn’t needed to engender xenophobia, because the right was already producing lots of that well before the loans.
    As you might expect, they don’t hate enough to pay those loans back, only to satisfy the primal urges of their terrible electorate.

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