“Tappanch”: Viktor Orbán’s phony wars

It doesn’t happen too often in the world of blogging that readers who are also avid and thoughtful commentators request that one of their own write a “guest post.” But this is what happened. “Tappanch” is always the first to find the salient news of the day. He is never satisfied with journalistic summaries but goes to the statistics. As you will see, he compares several sources of information to come up with his astute observations on the state of the Hungarian economy. I’m sure we will all learn from his considerable research on Viktor Orbán’s mostly lost economic wars.

  * * *

1. The war on debt

The “Basic Law” that replaced the Constitution on January 1, 2012 mandated that each yearly budget should decrease the “debt of the central government”/”complete domestic product” ratio (36 & 37). Subsequently, the Orbán government postponed the effective date of the start of this reduction to 2016. So it created a legal category that restricts the rights of the Parliament and Courts, contingent on the value of the “complete domestic product”, although there is no such notion in economics. Most people assume that the lawmakers meant GDP here.

On the other hand, the debt/GDP ratio depends on how we calculate the debt and how the GDP.

1.1 The denominator: How large is the Hungarian GDP?

The Central Statistical Office (KSH) currently gives three series of numbers.

(a) GDP in current prices.

(b) GDP in previous year’s average prices,

(c) GDP in 2005 average prices.

The three numbers for 2013 and, in brackets, for 2012 were reported to be

(a) 29114.43 [28048.07]

(b) 28360.18 [27175.44]

(c) 21984.68 [21742.74] billion HUFs on December 31, 2013 [2012].

The head of the potential government appointed “Budgetary Council,” Árpád Kovács, used slightly different numbers in a recent article for (a), namely: (a) 29203 [28048].

The GDP is quoted in HUF, but it is also meaningful to convert its forint value into EUR at some exchange rate. I will use the daily conversion rate of the European Central Bank, which can be found here.

The GDP values in EUR were

98.02 [95.96]

95.48 [92.97]

74.01 [74.39] billion EURs at the end of 2013 [2012].

Let’s see the numbers Hungary reported to the European Statistical Office.

2008: 105.54

2009:  91.42

2010:  96.24

2011:  98.92

2012:  96.97

2013:  98.07

So if one asks about the growth of the GDP in 2013, the answer will be at least sixfold. In HUF terms, we get to the numbers 3.80% [4.12% in Kovács’s article], 4.36%, and 1.11%, while in EUR terms, the growth was 2.15%, 2.69%, and -0.50%, an actual decline.

If we use unchanged HUF prices, i.e. (c), agriculture contributed to 0.9% of the 1.1% growth of the GDP.

In reality, the large volume increase in the corn and wheat production was offset by the significant decline in their price.

1.2 The numerator: How large is the national debt?

Are we talking about the debt of the central government? Do we include local governments or Social Security? Gross debt or net debt? Is the debt “consolidated”? Do we measure the debt in HUF or EUR? Which agency reports the debt?

1.2.1 The gross debt of the central government

This number stood at  19933.4 billion HUF when the Orbán government took over on May 31, 2010; at 20720.1 on December 31, 2012; 21998.6 on December 31, 2013; and 23569.3 on March 14. 2014.

So the gross debt has increased by 6.17% in 2013, but even this number was achieved by tricks to lower it artificially for a few weeks around December 31:

12.06:  22,728.0

12.13:  22,645.1

12.20:  22,365.5

12.23:  22,434.8

12.31:  21,998.1 (local minimum)

01.24:  22,862.1

01.31:  22,842.0

02.07:  22,899.3 (all-time high)

They asked the partially state-owned MOL and ordered the 100% state-owned Eximbank to purchase government bonds for 435 billion HUF. They were repaid in January.

If we count in euros, the debt has increased by a smaller percentage because of the declining value of the forint.

It was

72.35 billion EUR on May 31, 2010

70.89 on December 31, 2012

74.06 on December 31, 2013

74.93 on March 14, 2014

Thus the debt has increased by “only” 4.48% in euro terms in 2013. The debt of the central government has grown by 18.24% in HUF or by 3.75% in EUR since May 31, 2010. This last number looks great, unless we recall the fact that the Orbán government took over the private retirement funds (MaNyuP) of 2.9 million workers on May 31, 2011 and has spent it COMPLETELY by December 31, 2013.

statistics

How much of this money was spent for “debt reduction”? (The initial nationalization) + (subsequent voluntary offerings) + interest – (previous capital gains paid to the workers in 2011). The initial nationalization amounts to 2945.3 billion HUF. When I added up the items on the website of AKK, the office that handles issuing government bonds, I came up with the number of 2555.9 billion HUF, which might be a good approximation of the actual new debt the Orbán government created towards the future retirees.

If we add the spent fraction of the retirement forints to the debt, we come up with

19933.4 on May 31, 2010  [72.35 EUR]

22920.3 on December 31, 2012 [78.41 EUR]

24554.5 on December 31, 2013 [82.66 EUR]

26125.2 on March 14, 2014 [83.06 EUR]

So the Fidesz government has increased the debt of the central government by 7.13% in HUF or 5.42% in EUR during 2013. The total debt growth since May 31, 2010 amounts to 31.06% in HUF or 14.80% in EUR. The previous numbers came from the Treasury, which can be found at akk.hu.

The National Bank of Hungary, MNB, has gross debt numbers that are higher by about 1000 billion HUF than the sum of the debt reported by AKK and the spent retirement funds.

24085.5 on December 31, 2012 [82.40 EUR]

25598.8 on December 31, 2013 [86.18 EUR], a 6.28% rise in HUF or 4.59% in EUR during 2013.

The distribution of the gross debt in HUF and foreign currencies has changed since 2010, but the change is not as significant as some government propagandists suggest.

On 2014-01-31 [2010-05-31] {2008-05-31}

40.89% [45.70%] {27.77%} of the debt was owed in foreign currency, “deviza”

0.50% [ 1.26%] { 0.03%} in “other obligations”

58.61% [53.04%] {72.20%} in forints (Source AKK’s website)

1.2.2 Budget deficit and EU support

The budgetary deficit and the growth of indebtness has been mitigated significantly by the support Hungary receives from the European Union. The net EU contribution to Hungary in billions of EURs:

2008: 1.12

2009: 2.72

2010: 2.75

2011: 4.42

2012: 3.28

2013: 4.1  [low estimate, based on Lázár’s statement 4.1= 5.05-0.95]

2014: 4.22 [by the budget plan, 5.21-0.99 @296.9 EUR/HUF]

In this article I use the yearly currency exchange rates EUR/HUF and EUR/USD provided by Bundesbank.

In the 2014 budget plan (September 2013 version), the EU support amounts to more than 10% (!) of the expected revenue, while 7.4% of the outlays were designated to service the interest on the government debt.

Domestic revenue/outlays equals only 85% in the 2014 plan.

In the entire 2014-2021 European budget cycle, Hungary expects to receive 7200 billion HUF, i.e. more than €3.2 billion yearly.

The nominal deficit was:

2008:  3.87= 5696/1.4708

2009:  4.13= 5764/1.3948

2010:  4.22= 5599/1.3257

2011: -4.19=-5833/1.3920

2012:  1.93= 2481/1.2848

The nominal 2013 deficit was €3.13 billion according to financial minister Varga’s January statement.

Let us compare the nominal deficit numbers with those in Kovács’s article. Through 2012, he uses the same numbers Hungary reported to the European Statistical Office as “general government deficit”, which includes Social Security and local governments as well. See here and here.

2008: 3.94

2009: 4.23

2010: 4.15

2011:-4.28

2012: 1.98

2013: 2.32

Kovács contradicts Varga for 2013: Varga stated that the 2013 deficit was 929 billion HUF on January 22, while Kovács gave the 2013 number as 689 billion on March 13. But a recent (February 28) KSH publication puts the deficit of the central government at €3.30 billion (979.8 billion HUF), and the “consolidated” deficit at €3.13.

year: central budget; public finances (államháztartás); with local governments

2010: 3.10; 3.29; 4.07

2011: 6.18; 6.23; 5.73

2012: 2.11; 2.07; 1.76

2013: 3.30; 3.13; n/a

(See p. 26, p. 92 of KSH’s website)

The first two months of the 2014 produced a nominal deficit of 582/305= €1.91 billion euros, which leaves only €1.20 billion of deficit for the remaining ten months of 2014.

Let us calculate a more genuine deficit number, equaling the nominal deficit + the used retirement funds + net EU support

2008: 5.06 =   3.94+0+1.12

2009: 6.55 =   4.23+0+2.72

2010: 6.90 =   4.15+0+2.75

2011: 6.81 =  -4.28+6.67+4.42

2012: 6.49 =   1.98+1.23+3.28

2013: 8.57 =   3.30+1.17+4.1 [KSH data + AKK data + estimate from Lázár’s statement]

2013: 7.59 =   2.32+1.17+4.1 [Kovács data for the first number]

2013: 9.61 =   4.34+1.17+4.1 [see 1.2.3 for the first number]

2014: 7.33 =   3.11+0+4.22   [budget plan]

Simicska’s Közgép won at least 432 billion HUF in public tenders in 2013, so about 30% of the EU support goes through the company of the former treasurer of the ruling Fidesz party. We can state with certainty that the genuine budget deficit was the largest ever in 2013.

1.2.3 The debt of the local governments

Here we use the data of the MNB that can be found here.

The liabilities of the government in 109 HUF at the end of 2013 [2012], growth in 2013:

Central government : 25598.8 [24085.5], 6.28%

Social security fund:  51.5 [  164.5] [the disappeared retirement funds do not appear as liabilities!]

Local governments :  637.4 [ 1280.4]

Total liabilities : 26287.7 [25530.4], 2.97%

“Consolidated” liabilities: 26131.5 [25281.7], 3.36%

“Consolidated debt”: 23067.8 [22392.8], 3.01%

“Consolidated” means that “sub-sectors of the general government” are excluded, as the second note in the MNB spreadsheet explains.

This “consolidated debt” is the number Mr. Kovács uses in his article cited above.

Assets of the government:

Central government:  5848.3 [6583.4], -11.17%

Social security fund:  396.1 [ 368.7],

Local governments:  1592.1 [1414.3],

Total assets:  7836.5 [8366.4], – 6.63%

“Consolidated”assets:  7680.3 [8117.8], – 5.54%

Total net liabilities:

Central government:  19750.5 [17502.1], 12.85%

All governments: 18451.2 [17164.0],  7.50%

“Consolidated” net : 18451.2 [17163.9],  7.50%

Notice that the 2013 general government deficit that can be be concluded from these numbers is (18451.2-17164.0)/296.87= €4.34 billion, and not the €2.32 Kovács or the €3.13 Varga and KSH reported.

Let me summarize: the net financial position of the government is worse than what the gross debt numbers indicate.

During 2013, the increase of the debt amounted to

net debt: 12.85% in the central government,

net debt:  7.50% in the central and local governments combined.

gross debt: 6.28% in the central government,

gross debt: 3.36% in the central and local governments combined.

1.3 The mystical ratios

If you have the right to choose your favorite numerator and denominator, the desired ratio can be achieved with ease. We saw that Budgetary Council chairman Kovács counts with a unique, much lower deficit for 2013 than minister Varga. He also uses a higher “GDP in current prices” for 2013.

His calculations for 2013 [2012]:

Debt: 23068/22393, an increase of 3.01% [“consolidated” debt]

GDP:  29203/28048, an increase of 4.12% [GDP in current prices]

ratio:  78.99% [79.84%]

Let us calculate the ratio using liabilities of the central government from 1.2.2!

Debt: 25598.8/24085.5, an increase of 6.28%

GDP : 29114.43/28048.07, an increase of 3.80% [data provided by the statistical office KSH]

ratio: 87.92% [85.87%]

So we found official data showing the “ratio of desire” up in 2013, contrary to the tenet of Fidesz’s own “Basic Law”.

The ratio from the “consolidated” deficit is the well published (23067.8-22392.8)/29114.43= 2.32%.

But the Maastricht criterion requires member states of the European Union to maintain the yearly ratio of (deficit of the central government + local governments + social security)/GDP below 3%.

This ratio was (18451.2-17164.0)/29114.43= 4.42% in 2013.

2. The war on unemployment

E = [employed in enterprises with at least 5 employees]

R = [employed in enterprises with four or less employees]

S = [self-employed]

N = [employed by non-profit organizations]

G = [employed by the government in regular positions]

F = [“fostered” workers, aka as “közmunkások”]

A = [workers abroad, who somehow are counted in the Hungarian numbers]

Employed = E+R+S+N+G+F+A

The last number A seems to be a closely-held secret, it was divulged only once. How many workers and their families work and reside abroad?

We can get some data from observed remittances to Hungary in 2012:

1. Germany: 105,000; $4100

2. USA: 83,000; $4800

3. Canada: 53,000; $4800

4. UK: 51,000; $2300

5. Austria: 40,000; $4600

6. Australia: 24,000; $4900

7: Switzerland: 17,000; $4000

8: Slovakia: 16,000; $3900

9: Sweden: 16,000; $4500

10:Israel: 13,000; $5700

11:France: 11,000; $5100

12: Romania: 8,000: $3100

13: Denmark: 4,000: $2800

14: Norway: 3,000: $3700

All other countries: 18,000

Total:  462,000

The low remittance from UK and Denmark might indicate that the workers there are more likely to stay with their families.

The second trick is to move some of the unemployed to the employed camp using the “közmunkás” category F. F is only an implicitly given number that can be calculated from the data of KSH.

The third problem is that some numbers are contained in moving averages, while others are disclosed every month. Here are the numbers for the three-month average of October-December 2013 [2012]* or for December 2013 [2012] :

E = 1825.7 [1791.7], +1.90% change during 2013,

R* =  785.6 [ 812.3], -3.29%

S* =  439.2 [ 454.9], -3.45%

N =   99.6 [ 104.5], -4.69%

G =  686.6 [ 658.9], +4.20%

F =  178.5 [  86.9], +105.41%

A =   99.4 [  91.4], +8.75%   [the data is on page 6]

If we add these apples and oranges together, we can come up with the victory propaganda numbers of “Employment” = 4114.6 [4000.5], +2.85%

But if we discount the “fostered” workers and the workers abroad included in the statistics, the growth in employment equals the less than great number of 0.38%.

Conclusions

So what do the numbers tell us? First of all, a lot of numbers are not public. Some numbers contradict each other.

Still, we are able to conclude that

1. The GDP growth in constant prices was 0.2% without agriculture in 2013. If agriculture is counted, the 1.1% growth in HUF becomes a 0.5% decline in EUR.

2. The Orban government has increased the debt to an all time high. The total debt growth since 2010-05-31 amounts to 31.06% in HUF or 14.80% [using ECB exchange rates] or 15.10% [using MNB exchange rates] in EUR, if we include the spent retirement funds.

3. The general government deficit reached a record high of €4.34 billion in 2013.

4. The number for the Maastricht deficit criterion was 4.42% in 2013.

5. The domestic employment without the “fostered” workers increased by 0.38%.

—-

P.S. Today, on March 18, 2014, Hungary sold $3 billion of new debt at 5.5% yearly interest. The official gross debt/GDP ratio will reach 84% to 85% at the end of March.

The 10-year bond premium over the 10-year US Treasury note. The data are from Portfolio.

2010: 2.65% (January)

2011: 3.10% (March)

2012: —-

2013: 3.45% (February), 3.25% (November)

2014: 2.875% (March) [over the US Treasury notes]

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70 comments

  1. Istvan: “can one take the problem of data manipulation carried out by the Hungarian government and effectively explain it to the average Hungarian who does not have a post secondary education?”

    In principle people need not understand the detailed calculation about the size of debt etc. to understand something is manipulated. It would suffice if they compared their reality with what is being promised, so income versus costs, and how much of the current spending has improved the public space (except the square in front of parliament), the health care system and the education system, public transport etc. For that you do not need secondary education. It needs people to believe that “something can be done about it”.

  2. Folks, there is a difference between an individual and a company or organization still carrying his name. There are many funds named after long dead personas.

  3. Those pulling the strings:
    the TAMÁS WELLS MURDER STORY as of now: Today, while being taken into custody died… in the police vehicle.

    After Wells’s sordid African money-laundering-cum-reinvigorated ‘Hungarian Airline’ pathetic and corrupt attempt, this time Fidesz’s trouble-making department invented that he would be useful to them for a slush-fund style muck-racking business which would be most useful if he were a dead person on whose lapel any badge of crookery could be hung.

    I am disgusted by the depth to which fidesz and co. will go to do any and all harm to its opposition including murdering individuals. Seems like a story befitting a Putyin “whats the big deal, its just one other person who dies in prison or on the way there” which is what the Russian chief exclaimed after an opposition lawyer, battling a legal case against Putin himself was being moved from one prison to another on evidently drummed-up charges.

    In the current instance, as Wells was well oiled in the passport forgery business, fidesz finds it useful to plant evidence to seem like Wells was establishing passports in the names of selected opposition Socialist politicians using the unused and available passports in Wells’ home-office safe – to which they gain access immediately after murdering him…

    And, though the inquiry is under the leadership of the judiciary and not the police, the passport information about those opposition figures who purportedly ordered fake passports from him is leaked by the Judiciary itself…

    And appropriately the investigation as to how Wells died during the police transfer is being handled by none other than the police department itself.

    Just as I seemed to see the campaign subsiding, up come a potentially never-ending slew of false charges that cannot really be substantiated as the principal figure has just been murdered…

    I cant believe this is going on smack in the center of Western Europe… Within a member nation of the European Union… A country which had sworn itself to correct behavior…

  4. andy – advance news: WELLS the upcoming revelations :
    Those pulling the strings:
    the TAMÁS WELLS MURDER STORY as of now: Today, while being taken into custody died… in the police vehicle.
    After Wells’s sordid African money-laundering-cum-reinvigorated ‘Hungarian Airline’ pathetic and corrupt attempt, this time Fidesz’s trouble-making department invented that he would be useful to them for a slush-fund style muck-racking business which would be most useful if he were a dead person on whose lapel any badge of crookery could be hung.
    I am disgusted by the depth to which fidesz and co. will go to do any and all harm to its opposition including murdering individuals. Seems like a story befitting a Putyin “whats the big deal, its just one other person who dies in prison or on the way there” which is what the Russian chief exclaimed after an opposition lawyer, battling a legal case against Putin himself was being moved from one prison to another on evidently drummed-up charges.
    In the current instance, as Wells was well oiled in the passport forgery business, fidesz finds it useful to plant evidence to seem like Wells was establishing passports in the names of selected opposition Socialist politicians using the unused and available passports in Wells’ home-office safe – to which they gain access immediately after murdering him…
    And, though the inquiry is under the leadership of the judiciary and not the police, the passport information about those opposition figures who purportedly ordered fake passports from him is leaked by the Judiciary itself…
    And appropriately the investigation as to how Wells died during the police transfer is being handled by none other than the police department itself.
    Just as I seemed to see the campaign subsiding, up come a potentially never-ending slew of false charges that cannot really be substantiated as the principal figure has just been murdered…
    I cant believe this is going on smack in the center of Western Europe… Within a member nation of the European Union… A country which had sworn itself to correct behavior…

    And where the ‘proud, religious’ Hungarians who should be shamed by all this?

  5. Efficacy at all costs. The modern world with its emphasis on technological efficiency, and its impact on the moral compass. Hungarians adrift. Lost and helpless, without even an idea of where to look for help. Surrendering to the con artistry of the Felcsutian.

  6. Hungary is supposed to get 21905.9 billion euros, i.e. about 6791 billion HUF @ current 310 EUR/HUF for cohesion in 2014-2020.

    Cohesion fund 27.5%
    less developed regions: 68.5%
    other 4%

    http://www.insideurope.eu/taxonomy/term/170

    If this is the 7200 billion Lazar was talking about, he expects EUR/HUF = 328 on the average in the next seven years.

  7. Recipients:

    1. Poland: 77.6 billion euros, or 22.05% of the total
    2. Italy: 32.8 billion
    3.Spain: 28.6
    4. Romania: 23.0
    5. Czechia 22.0
    6. Hungary 21.9
    7. Portugal: 21.5

  8. whoever :
    Not to say all is fine and dandy in Viktor’s Hungary, but last night I saw some analysis of UK, where debt-to-GDP ratios, national debt and the deficit are forecast to rise in the next few years despite painful austerity measures which hit the poorest. It really does seem the backdrop to tappanch’s numbers is that of a severe capitalist crisis. And is Viktor mitigating this? No. He and his pals are grabbing what they can.

    The issue is what is the long term growth potential? Strangely enough Austria, Germany or the UK each has a much better potential to grow even from 3x the Hungarian gdp/capita levels than Hungary does. That is the issue.

  9. kut, in my opinion the wider picture suggests that the picture for Hungary would be pretty bleak even if the MSZP had somehow engineered a victory in 2010.

    Looking at the eurozone, growth is set to be low and the crisis in the south looks set to further encroach upon the core countries (with France’s position especially vulnerable). And as for what was the EU-10 model economy – Ireland – well…

    In the UK, growth forecasts suggest a peak in growth this year of around 2.7% and then a slight decline in the next few years. This isn’t enough to begin to reduce the UK’s massive deficit levels. This means that any reductions after 2017 will have to come from the most painful cuts to the UK’s already tight benefits system, and will start to affect infrastructure and the skills base. Whilst the UK economy is generally tighter than Hungary’s – bear in mind that Hungary has an East-West divide on a greater level than the UK’s North-South divide – the fiscal prospects remain very poor.

    Hungary’s situation is somewhere between that of Poland (which has only managed by exporting its huge surplus of labour, in a possibly unsustainable manner, and which is now slowing down) and the crumbling states of Romania and Bulgaria. Probably these days, more towards the latter. As Gordon Bajnai has pointed out, the condition of Hungary will partially be determined by an increasingly problematic demographic base in the next 20 years. Pressures on smaller towns, villages and rural life in Hungary will only become more intense, and the political consequences of this will be unpredictable. My main point here is that even *with* more favourable demographic conditions, and a generally more adaptable and better-trained workforce, Hungary would still lack a growth model, because the West currently lacks a growth model. I’ll say this now, only a massive investment programme across Europe could even begin to divert the continent from potential catastrophe, and only a few political parties (eg SYRIZA in Greece) are advocating this.

  10. New employment data is out,
    the numbers contradict each other!

    http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/let/let21401.pdf

    p.33.

    F= # of fostered workers, in thousands:

    2013 January: 33.6
    2013 February: 27.0
    ….
    2013 October: 133.5
    2013 November: 179.4
    2013 December: 203.0
    2014 January: 198.4

    January, 2014-2013= 164.8

    A= workers employed abroad, but counted in the Hungarian statistics
    THe number is missing, as usual

    p. 31. vs p.7

    January 2014 [2013]
    G+F= 859.7 [682.5]
    G= 689.0 [652.1]

    Therefore
    F= 170.7 [30.4], growth 139.6
    THese numbers contradict with numbers on page 33.
    F= 198.4 [33.6], growth 164.8

  11. Comparison of
    http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/let/let21401.pdf
    and
    http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/let/let21312.pdf

    January 2014 {December 2013} [January 2013]

    p.2.
    E+N+G+F+A, i.e. All employment – (R+S)= 2799.2 {2790.4} [2587.7]

    E+N+G+A= 2600.8 {2587.4} [2554.2]

    Therefore
    F= 198.4 {203.0} [33.5] <———- ! 1st contradiction

    p.3
    E= 1836.8 {1825.7} [1800.9]

    F+G= 859.7 {865.4} [682.5]

    p.4.
    G= 689.0 {686.0} [652.1]
    THerefore
    F= 170.7 {179.4} [30.4] <——- ! 1st contradiction

    N= 102.7 {99.6} [104.3]

    Therefore
    E+N+G= 2628.5 {2611.3} [2557.3]
    Thus
    A= -27.7 { -23.9} [ -3.1] <———! 2nd contradiction, A cannot be negative!

    A was supposed to be {+99.4}, see p.6 of
    http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/fog/fog21312.pdf

    Is KSH so bad at cooking the books or am I missing something?

  12. whoever: “Hungary would still lack a growth model, because the West currently lacks a growth model.”

    I would have thought that what is (more generally) aimed at is some reasonable standard of living given the current technological opportunities. I may have missed something but in Hungary the room for improvement is quite large, not to say massive. So even supposing that “the West” may be at some technological frontier and growth only low because of that (but that is just a hypothesis), why should Hungary lack a growth model because of that? Hungary has an ample need for catching up. I suggest to have a closer look at the “unorthodox policies” of Orban, Matolcsy and Co. also called personal enrichment of a few and impoverishment of the many in search of an explanation why Hungary “lacks a growth model”.

  13. tappanch :
    Hungary is supposed to get 21905.9 billion euros, i.e. about 6791 billion HUF @ current 310 EUR/HUF for cohesion in 2014-2020.
    Cohesion fund 27.5%
    less developed regions: 68.5%
    other 4%
    http://www.insideurope.eu/taxonomy/term/170
    If this is the 7200 billion Lazar was talking about, he expects EUR/HUF = 328 on the average in the next seven years.

    A question: You said the state managed to push down the national debt for the end of 2013 by prevailing upon Mol and Eximbank to purchase HUF 435 billion in short-term bonds. If the state issues bonds (=debt), then doesn’t the amount get added to the national debt?

Comments are closed.