Attila Ara-Kovács and Bálint Magyar: Can we learn from history?

After so many years, the Hungarian state is finding itself for the first time in a conflict where the external limits to the actions of its voluntarist leaders are determined not by impersonal economic processes but by equally voluntaristic factors the dimensions of which, however, are much larger and cast a shadow much longer than their own. With no pressure from outside, Hungary’s current government has sided with a policy which may seem advantageous from the viewpoint of holding on to its power but run contrary to the country’s interests and long-term objectives. Moreover, it promises that the country will once again end up sharing defeat and disgrace with forces that will be remembered by history with nothing but contempt.

CRIMEA: THE BEGINNING OF AN ERA

What goes on in Crimea today is by no means a result of random incidents but fits perfectly into Russia’s aspirations to resurrect the empire and, on the other, is inspired by the same fateful divisions, fraught with ethnic conflicts, that are as characteristic of Ukraine today as they were in Georgia in 2008. Russia’s re-positioning of its world political influence is justified neither by economic performance nor by military potential in a global context. Just as at the time of the Romanovs in the 19th century or Stalin’s empire-building decades in the 20th, the only factor motivating Russian policy vis-à-vis its neighbors is naked power politics exercised at what it considers its peripheries. Back then, Russia was unable to present itself as a great power of full value, capable of a global performance and holding out the promise of an alternative comparable to that offered by its rivals. Nor is it capable of the same feat today. In fact, there is a reverse relationship: whenever Russia reaches the outer limits of its potential for peaceful growth, parallel with that, its aggressiveness begins to grow. As a consequence, cooperation with the Russian empire in the international arena could never be conducted in a “businesslike” contractual manner but by bargains based on the power conditions, genuine or assumed, of any given time.

It was during the reign of Cathering the Great that Russia annexed the Crime in 1783 Source: Wikipedia.org

It was during the reign of Catherine the Great that Russia annexed the Crimea in 1783
Source: Wikipedia.org

A certain amount of aloofness was always highly advisable for the great powers, whether rivals or allies in a given period, when dealing with a Russia of this character. This was so in the 19th century when Russia was regarded by the world practically as an Asian power, but also in the 20th when forced alliance or openly hostile Cold War policies were predominant. The limited courses left accessible by geographical closeness for nations which did not have the military and economic power to resist Moscow’s designs are a different issue. These nations were doomed to maneuver in a field of force dominated by a provisional alliance between the western democracies and an empire struggling with permanent economic crisis yet unable to “outgrow” its despotism. Seeking balance between the great-power blocs was a failure even when they were in a stable state (perhaps with the exception of interwar Czechoslovakia), but trying to stay afloat in escalating conflicts which promised to last long usually forced them into compromises guaranteeing a losing position. The circumstances are very similar today with the difference that the former Central Europe and the Baltic have since been integrated into the European Union, and their nations are all NATO members.  NATO membership entails their obligatory protection, meaning that their freedom cannot be sacrificed even for the sake of avoiding a world war. The geographic regions still open to bargaining between the great-power blocs have narrowed down and shifted to the east. Russia’s empire-building ambitions aimed at a Eurasian Union are intended precisely to prevent “switching teams” between international blocs, a game that could be more or less openly played by the countries of the region in the past quarter century.

That is the position in which the post-Soviet states “stuck” in the Russian sphere of interest even after 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated find themselves. They have made occasional attempts to break out of their predicament through their “color revolutions”. Of these states, Ukraine is the most important, not only because of its size and economic potential, but also because if, after 300 years, it were to succeed to ultimately free itself from the bonds of co-habitation with Russia, it would eliminate even the appearance of Russia’s great-power status. The events that took place in Kiev’s Maidan have already forced the Kremlin to modify its strategy. 2015 was set as the original target date for the formal announcement of the new imperial union on the construction of which Putin has been working for years. Without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union will never be what it was meant to be according to the Russian blueprint. For one thing, it will grow much more distant from Europe, the entity with which the biggest share of the trade and cultural relations of the Russian Federation has been conducted ever since it was founded. On the other, it will become overwhelmingly Asian, making Moscow more vulnerable to Chinese pressure as well as hostage to the dynamically developing, increasingly dynastic post-Soviet mafia-states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan).

DOMINO EFFECT IN THE BUFFER ZONE

1. The occupation of Crimea should therefore be regarded as the beginning only. The reputation of the Russian regime is unlikely to be damaged any further, so what we can expect is most likely the uninhibited assertion of its real or assumed interests. That includes the restoration of the unity of the one-time Soviet military-economic complex for which major supply capacities used to be provided by industrial facilities located in Ukraine. The dress rehearsal for that has already been completed in the shadow of weapons in Crimea with a referendum intimating the Wilsonian principles. Even though the result had not been questionable for a moment; the approval of Putin’s will by the population of the peninsula was shamelessly fraudulent. (Just in Simferopol, the rate of “yes” votes was 123 per cent.) The next moves could be the “soft” annexation of the industrial regions of the Donetsk Basin, the population of which is also overwhelmingly Russian, as well as of Odessa and the coastal area, again in the shadow of weapons. That would practically cut off Ukraine from the sea and rob it of the highly important hydrocarbon repositories of the continental shelf.

2. With the tiny Moscow-supported puppet state of Transnistria announcing its desire to join Russia (the breakaway mini-state, though still formally a part of Moldova, is centered in the town of Tiraspol), we see a new phase of the encirclement of Ukraine unfolding. With the potential annexation of Odessa and with Moscow’s inciting the ethnic minorities, like the Gagauzes, of the southwest Ukrainian areas against Kiev, Transnistria will help establish a contiguous zone under Russian influence, putting Kiev increasingly at the mercy of the Russian empire and placing a bigger price tag on western solidarity with Ukraine.

3. The events in Crimea and especially Transnistria may force the truncated Republic of Moldova to escape into a rapidly established union with Romania. The conditions and prospects for such a union are already openly discussed by Moldovan politicians and analysts. Some see full union as an inevitable prerequisite for instant guarantees by the EU and NATO, for which not only the regional and economic conditions are in place but is also reinforced by tradition ranging from common language to shared national symbols. Others, considering the mixed ethnic background, envision a federal-type community as more viable.

4. In Subcarpathia, the agents of Russian nationalism have already started to provoke the region’s ethnic minorities with mother countries outside the Ukrainian borders (Hungarians, Romanians) into thinking that this might be the right historical moment and manner for their reunification with the mother country. In reality, for them it would be a game of Russian roulette where the player is offered a revolver with all chambers loaded.

At the same time though, due to the threatening presence of extreme nationalists in western Ukraine, the fears of these minorities are by no means groundless. Even if they refrain from raising a strong voice in defense of their minority rights, with no military protection to back them up, they might easily become targeted by frustrated Ukrainians with their national feelings hurt by the Russians against whom they can do nothing. Their position could become even more precarious if their claims could be interpreted as a preparatory stage to secession.

In addition, there is no great power around to remotely support an attempt at breaking away. Even Russia’s interests end at sowing political chaos in Ukraine. On the other hand, every single “mother country” affected is a member of NATO and the EU, both of which rule out meddling with the borders developed after World War II. Also, in 1994 they provided special guarantees for the territorial integrity of Ukraine when the Budapest Memorandum was signed, the very document on the legal strength of which they attack Russia for the annexation of Crimea. Moreover, Ukraine, though not an energy producer itself, has a key role in the transport of energy, so any hostility, or even deterioration in relations, might endanger the energy security of a number of European nations, mainly that of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.

In the light of all this, the extreme nationalist visions of the “return” of territories, fuelled by Russian interests, as broadcasted in Hungary by Echo TV (a television channel owned by circles close to the governing Fidesz party) with their not-so-subtle tone of encouragement are suicidal and threaten the very existence of the Hungarian minority in Subcarpathia.

5. Another highly sensitive problem is the impact of the afterlife of the Ukrainian situation on Transylvania. In the wake of the annexation of Crimea, sealed by a referendum, the Romanian political elite is already looking with growing concern at claims of regional autonomy for the Szekler region, only made more provocative by personal visits by leading Fidesz politicians and Hungarian neo-Nazi leaders. By likening the position of Hungarians in Transylvania to that of the Crimean Tartars, the former Bishop and future Fidesz MEP László Tőkés poured oil on fire, providing further arguments to all those in Romania, whose goal it is to curtail the rights of that country’s Hungarian minority. In the wake of declarations of this kind by Hungarian political actors and developments in Crimea, aspirations of Szekler autonomy are decoded by public opinion in Romania as a first step on the road to the establishment of political and administrative conditions for eventual secession. In such an atmosphere it will hardly be surprising for the Romanian parties to resist granting any concession, even those which did not appear hopeless before, like giving prevalence to the ethnic-cultural principle in the development of EU regions.

Such fears will not appear altogether groundless to an unbiased observer either—for instance to representatives of the European Union—if, for instance, the major change in Hungarian policy regarding dual citizenship is also noticed. At the beginning, the introduction of dual citizenship was declared by Fidesz to be a symbolic act expressing the belonging together of the Hungarian nation as a cultural community. However, by granting voting rights to dual citizens residing outside Hungary, something which they had earlier denied they would ever do, they turned all those wishing to take advantage of that opportunity into citizens with equal rights of two countries at the same time. With that, these dual citizens have gained an entitlement in which emphasis is laid on their affiliation to Hungary even from the viewpoint of public policy. In certain critical periods like the current one, this poses a serious risk to the social life of the community, raising suspicions in Romanians that they may be facing the possibility of losing Transylvania again. As unrealistic as such a scenario may be, the fears it fosters politically are all the more real.

ADVENTURISM CLOAKED IN NATIONALISTIC RHETORIC 

There is little doubt that Hungary does not have any interest served by nationalistically loaded, provocative policies. Still, the Fidesz government is pursuing precisely such policies. Why is it doing that? The reason is that the mafia state absolutely needs the tense atmosphere of conflicts, genuine or made-up, internally as well as in its relationship with its neighbors. On the world political stage too: it continues its game of doublespeak with the European Union and its allies. It drags its feet in reacting to Russian aggression while sucking up to Putin’s imperial authoritarianism. A part of the Hungarian leadership—the head of state whose role is exclusively ceremonial and the impotent foreign minister—is reassuring the world about the government’s full solidarity with the trans-Atlantic alliance, while Orbán, the real source of all power makes decisions contrary to that solidarity. A secretary of state of the Foreign Ministry summons the Russian ambassador to express his concern over the annexation of Crimea while the same Russian ambassador is ensured by another secretary of state that the whole thing is nothing but a smokescreen or pure theatricals. And indeed, the nuclear energy deals signed recently with the Russians are to stay in force, as has been declared by Orbán, their fulfillment being—and remaining—a priority for the government.

A state of permanent mobilization, bellicose talk and the cult of seeking enemies all serve for Orbán to win a mandate (with a two-third parliamentary majority, if he can) for a long-term suspension of law and morality, and thus for stabilizing his rule. By pursuing such policies, however, the country is once again ending up on the wrong side, the side of the losers, while its international credibility is being further reduced.

In the sharpening conflict between East and West, quite to the contrary of what Orbán says, the region will never become the manufacturing centre of European industry but is far more likely to turn into a collision zone in which there is no economic growth, democratic traditions are diluted and the solutions of an eastern-type autocracy prove practicable. This is exactly the kind of place which not only foreign capital is fleeing from but talented people with an enterprising spirit also leave behind.

As a part of the region, owing to its internal conditions and external circumstances Hungary may find itself stagnating or on a downward slope for a long time to come. The damages that follow can be neither prevented nor reduced without a clear-cut, unequivocal and unmistakable commitment to the west, the type so characteristic of Poland, for instance. Particularly if in the meantime Orbán collaborates with the extreme right, the neo-Nazis, undisturbed. In the thinking of Fidesz, however, such considerations of genuine national policy are overwritten by the direct power and financial interests of the adopted political family of the mafia state. For them, therefore, the adventurism cloaked in nationalist rhetoric with which they react to a situation the seriousness of which they fail to recognize, is perfectly suitable.

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84 comments

  1. We do NOT know the percentage of the mailed-in votes that were sent in by the voters themselves and the percentage of the votes that were prepared at the Fidesz offices in Transylvania, Serbia and Ukraine and were dropped off en masse at a consulate!

    Fidesz offices in Transylvania:
    (offices of a Fidesz affiliate, supported by Hungarian taxpayers’ money)

    http://emnt.org/regi/orszagos-hirek/az-erdelyi-magyar-nemzeti-tanacs-demokracia-kozpontjainak-elerhetosegei.html

  2. @Angela

    Foreign observers estimated the Fidesz crowd at 100,000. The 450,000 is a Fidesz propaganda number.

    It is also true that the Opposition crowd was estimated at 50,000.

  3. Logical contradiction in the posted numbers about the mail-in votes.

    Received ballots from the consulates/embassies (külképviselet)

    April 2:

    10 AM: 47,293 (my post #12)
    5 PM: 43,608 (my post #48)

  4. Ron :
    Wolfi: The wages can’t be too high (then the products would be no longer competitive) and not too low – then the people would move abroad.
    The costs cannot be too high. The wages can be high, as long as there is effective and efficient production, so that the wages as percentage of the costs of manufacturing is low.
    The problem in Hungary is that the (net and gross) wages are low, but that the costs of the wages is high, mainly due to the fact that the Social Security and other wage taxes on top of the Gross Salary (in other words the Super-majority taxes) are high and not capped.
    Also the other problem is that most employees are well educated, but there is a big difference (qua salary) between Management and subordinates. Some times the difference is more that ten fold.

    Well, Ron, this is a question – many people in Hungary *think* they are educated, but many (perhaps all but the very top 10% of academic achievers) are left unable to quantify the amount that they don’t know, as well as what they do know.

  5. Angela Bogazcy :

    @ Eva S. Balogh: ‘I’m afraid there is plenty of proof that Fidesz is planning to make sure that they win. If necessary by cheating.’

    Where, pray, is that ‘proof’?

    Well, we just learned that in a small town in Szabolcs County suddenly there are 800 fewer voters now than a few weeks ago. At the same time in Zugló, suddenly 800 new voters appeared. The campaign manager of Zugló Mayor Papcsák who is also the Fidesz candidate in the district is the small town’s mayor in Szabolcs. Zugló is a district where the opposition candidate has a real chance. What a coincidence, don’t you think?

    And what about all those nice Szeklers who can collect all their friends’ envelopes and put into the ballot box thousands of unmarked envelopes at Hungarian consulates in Romania? The actual voter doesn’t even have to be there. Is this a correct way to run an election?

    Maybe no proof, but mighty suspicious. It seems that you are a true believer whose faith couldn’t be shaken even if someone cheated right in front of your eyes..

  6. whoever: Well, Ron, this is a question – many people in Hungary *think* they are educated, but many (perhaps all but the very top 10% of academic achievers) are left unable to quantify the amount that they don’t know, as well as what they do know.

    I am not talking about academic achievers, but plumbers, policemen and women, accountants. I notice a big difference in salaries between the subordinates and their direct bosses.

  7. Angela Bogazcy :
    @ Eva S. Balogh: ‘I’m afraid there is plenty of proof that Fidesz is planning to make sure that they win. If necessary by cheating.’
    Where, pray, is that ‘proof’? And what need is there to cheat for a political party that is tipped by all pollsters to be the runaway winner of the upcoming elections? And what need is there to cheat for a political party of which 450,000 supporters turn out to demonstrate their support, as Fidesz supporters did last Saturday? (Should you not be concerned to explain why Fidesz has no viable opposition? Might that have anything to do with the fully publicised, massive skulduggeries of what passes for ‘the Left’ in Hungary?)
    And why did you address the above-quoted remark to me? It has nothing to do with the content of my (only) post, above.

    Angela,
    If you would of took the time, and would not come here “barging in” with your only post, you could of followed page by page, fact by fact all the election developments that points to freud.
    You expect us to re-list every item that we posted so far because out of the blue you show up on the board. If you would get the common courtesy (not the quality of Fidesz believers) to research rye blog you would of also seen that our PROVEN experience that there are Fidesz friendly blogs that send their trolls here just to bark in two sentences then they as they came, the same way disappear.
    Let me tell you one single election freud that every intelligent person would understand right away (so I am crossing my fingers here). It was posted about five times by now, so I never now…
    Although there are plenty of voting locations are set up close to some outside the border voters (as close as 5 km), still some of those voters are able to mail in their vote. Other voters from outside the border would have to travel around 4000km to cast their vote.
    Although I did fill out my voting request, I never received a reply, so from my personal point of view, I was cheated out of my right to vote!
    How about Fidesz overspending their election campaign? That is a freud too.
    How about Fidesz free transportation for Peace March / COF that is filled with election material.
    THere are hundreds of new so called “voting tourists” that miraculously registered in their new address in the two-chance districts, and there is no demographic explanation.
    There will no investigation held about the fake parties that registered, and there will no investigation about the names traded by the fake parties.
    “Volt egy dongó,
    meg egy légy,
    tovább is van,
    mondjam még? ”
    (The above is a well liked rhyme by Tamko Sirato Karoly. Each verse finishes with the same two lines,
    “there is more
    should I go on?”

  8. Ron, whoever, surely you’ve read about this:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    “The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which unskilled individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly rating their ability much higher than is accurate. This bias is attributed to a metacognitive inability of the unskilled to recognize their ineptitude”

    This corresponds nicely with the idea of conservative, right-wing people to take too many things for granted:

    My grandfather did it this way, my father too – so why should I change my ways?

  9. Unfortunately there were a lot of desinformation, misinformation and lies about the relative size of the Heroes’ Square Fidesz demonstration and the Opera leftist demonstrations.

    Some facts:

    The press briefing of the organizers of the opera leftist rally themselves only said 35 000 people participated. It is well known that organizers almost always overestimate. Anything more than 35 000 is such a laughable lie that even the organizers themselves did not attempt it!! Bad propaganda!
    http://index.hu/belfold/2014/03/30/bepotolja_marcius_15-ot_az_ellenzek/

    It is fine to estimate crowds but it is not fine to lie about them. If someone estimates a size they must present the calculations that underpin the estimation. Photographs that show the size of the crowd are a must in determining the real size of the crowd.

    http://imgur.com/7cMPNt3

    An estimation is simple how much ground is covered by Heroes Square and nearby streets. It is about 100 000 square meters. But the exact number can be looked up measured. And then we can get a realistic estimate from the pictures. Was there one person per square meter? What does a crowd look like with 1 person per square meter? Is it like in the picture? It doesn’t matter everyone can make their own estimations but they have to be based in fact.

    I would also advise anyone not to fall victim to nazi type thinking. In those times it was assumed that anyone who was a Jew is not credible. These days some people think that anyone who is a Hungarian is automaticly not credible. This is why some people put “foreign” opinions above every and all Hungarian opinions, estimations and writings. By default anything non-Hungarian is more credible to them. But this type of thinking is deeply flawed it was flawed in the 30s and it is flawed now.

  10. Eva S. Balogh :

    Angela Bogazcy :
    @ Eva S. Balogh: ‘I’m afraid there is plenty of proof that Fidesz is planning to make sure that they win. If necessary by cheating.’
    Where, pray, is that ‘proof’?

    Well, we just learned that in a small town in Szabolcs County suddenly there are 800 fewer voters now than a few weeks ago. At the same time in Zugló, suddenly 800 new voters appeared. The campaign manager of Zugló Mayor Papcsák who is also the Fidesz candidate in the district is the small town’s mayor in Szabolcs. Zugló is a district where the opposition candidate has a real chance. What a coincidence, don’t you think?
    And what about all those nice Szeklers who can collect all their friends’ envelopes and put into the ballot box thousands of unmarked envelopes at Hungarian consulates in Romania? The actual voter doesn’t even have to be there. Is this a correct way to run an election?
    Maybe no proof, but mighty suspicious. It seems that you are a true believer whose faith couldn’t be shaken even if someone cheated right in front of your eyes..

    Eva,

    let us analyze the following two lists and the meaning of the sentences, because I am confused.

    (a)
    BUDAPEST főváros 08. számú egyéni választókerületéből
    az alábbi választókerületekbe mehetnek el szavazni az átjelentkezéssel szavazó választópolgárok

    http://www.nvi.hu/dyn/pv14/vertaj/hu/M01/E08/igstata.html

    and

    (b)
    “BUDAPEST főváros 08. számú egyéni választókerületébe
    az alábbi választókerületekből jöhetnek el szavazni az átjelentkezést kérő választópolgárok”

    http://www.nvi.hu/dyn/pv14/vertaj/hu/M01/E08/igstatb.html

    Does (a) mean
    list of the people who will cast their vote for district 8 in other districts ?

    Does (b) mean
    list of the people who will cast their vote in district 8 for other districts ?

    At 8 PM, 04-02-2014
    (a) = 891
    (b) = 2713

    If I interpret the sentences as above, the concrete cheating rumor is impossible, because the Szabolcs subset of (a) has just 27 people.

    If I interpret (a) and (b) the way around, it would be possible. since 2713 > 800,

    but the Szabolcs subset of (b) has just 260 people.

    So I conclude that

    either the official lists above contain falsified numbers

    or the rumor you mentioned is not true

  11. Rumor or not rumor? Well, I heard it straight from Gergely Bárándy. The MSZP candidate in the district will ask for investigation. Of course, it still can be a rumor. We will see.

  12. @juhika

    Look up Heroes square on Google map. The rectangle of the square between Dózsa út and the archangel sculpture is 150 m x 100 m = 15,000 m^2, not 100,000 m^2 as you claimed.

    If there are 4 people / m^2 (a generously squeezed if), the rectangle can contain no more than 60,000 people.

    OK, I can see from your photo that there were also people on Sugár út and on Dózsa út.
    So the 100,000 estimate for the Orban crowd is about right.

  13. wolfi :
    Ron, whoever, surely you’ve read about this:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    “The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which unskilled individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly rating their ability much higher than is accurate. This bias is attributed to a metacognitive inability of the unskilled to recognize their ineptitude”
    This corresponds nicely with the idea of conservative, right-wing people to take too many things for granted:
    My grandfather did it this way, my father too – so why should I change my ways?

    I am not talking about unskilled workers, but the specific case I know about that a senior registered bookkeeper (not a CPA or Auditor) was paid 25% of his colleague who had the same education and experience, but one year more seniority.

    But also in other situations I saw skilled Hungarian workers (who would have been paid a normal salary in Germany, Holland or Belgium) received sometimes as much as 10% of those salaries. Partly this is due to the tax and social security system in Hungary, but also the practice to pay non-management significant less that in other European countries,

    Btw this is not official statistics, but my observations of being a MD of a salary administration office.

  14. The opposition crowd occupied Sugár út between the Danube side of Opera to Oktogon, a 400 m stretch.

    The street is 34 m wide.

    400 x 34 = 13 600 m^2, it can hold 54,400 people.

    So we the estimates for the opposition vs Orban crowd of 50 vs 100 thousand people were about right.

  15. Ron, the situation regarding wages in Hungary is really almost catastrophic – we just talked to our young ones on skype and they barely subsist on their money. If anything extraordinary should happen …

    Of course you might say who needs skype, but he depends on his computer and the internet for his job – and of course has to pay for these things himself!

    And this is just an example, we hear similar stories every day – of course there are some who made it, but they either were extremely lucky or …

    Especially if you don’t own (i e have inherited …) a house or a flat.

    So I don’t understand that people can believe “Hungary is doing better under Fidesz” – that’s true for just a few selected people!

    A bit OT:

    Those trolls that appear here more or less regularly are really funny in a way – the “problems” that they try to solve …

  16. @ tappanch: ‘Foreign observers estimated the Fidesz crowd at 100,000. The 450,000 is a Fidesz propaganda number.’

    The estimate 444,000-460,000 is the Interior Ministry’s. You know, don’t you, that it has aerial photos and the estimate of its space-crowd reckoning equipment to substantiate its figures? Your ‘foreign observers’ had neither.

  17. Angela Bogazcy :
    The estimate 444,000-460,000 is the Interior Ministry’s. You know, don’t you, that it has aerial photos and the estimate of its space-crowd reckoning equipment to substantiate its figures? Your ‘foreign observers’ had neither.

    Well, they probably do know how many people came (and how much it cost), having organised them to come in buses.

  18. @ Eva Balogh: ‘Maybe no proof, but mighty suspicious. It seems that you are a true believer whose faith couldn’t be shaken even if someone cheated right in front of your eyes.’

    What a powerful argument, especially for its ad hominem thrust! But thank you for admitting the absence of proof.

  19. You know, Angela, that that ministry is under control of Fidesz, don’t you?

    Anyway, if numbers count, then you must eat sh*t – billions of flies can’t be wrong!

    Maybe you should try to answer some of the other points being made here re Fidesz manipulating the elections – start by reading all the comments, that’ll keep you occupied!

  20. @ Some1: ‘If you would of took the time, and would not come here “barging in” with your only post, you could of followed page by page, fact by fact all the election developments that points to freud.’

    I take it this is a Freudian slip? But to remind you: I came in on a thread that was talking about the situation in Ukraine. I am surprised that it diverted to innuendo about election fraud in Hungary. And you might have noticed that your moderator herself concedes that there are no ‘facts’ in the ‘fraud’ claims.

  21. Angela Bogazcy :

    @ tappanch: ‘Foreign observers estimated the Fidesz crowd at 100,000. The 450,000 is a Fidesz propaganda number.’

    The estimate 444,000-460,000 is the Interior Ministry’s. You know, don’t you, that it has aerial photos and the estimate of its space-crowd reckoning equipment to substantiate its figures? Your ‘foreign observers’ had neither.

    Let’s give up. Angela is right. After all, it doesn’t matter.

  22. Angela Bogazcy :
    @ Some1: ‘If you would of took the time, and would not come here “barging in” with your only post, you could of followed page by page, fact by fact all the election developments that points to freud.’
    I take it this is a Freudian slip? But to remind you: I came in on a thread that was talking about the situation in Ukraine. I am surprised that it diverted to innuendo about election fraud in Hungary. And you might have noticed that your moderator herself concedes that there are no ‘facts’ in the ‘fraud’ claims.

    Nope. No need to over explain yourself. you keep loosing credibility. You stumbled upon the the blog because of the Crimean issue, and then it unfolded itself to what is happening in Hungary. No freudian slip but lousy autocorrect. It is you buy the way who tried to tell us that there is no chance that there is some cheating going on with the elections. I provided proof that you asked for, but you did not reply to that. Why not? ARe you saying that all what is listed above points to a fair election? I am waiting for your answer. I also would love if you would reply point by point for all the suspicious activities as posted.

  23. Angela Bogazcy :
    @ Eva Balogh: ‘Maybe no proof, but mighty suspicious. It seems that you are a true believer whose faith couldn’t be shaken even if someone cheated right in front of your eyes.’
    What a powerful argument, especially for its ad hominem thrust! But thank you for admitting the absence of proof.

    THe proofs’ were listed already. What else do you want? Can you reply to the proofs listed above, and stop keep asking for it.
    For your convenience:
    You expect us to re-list every item that we posted so far because out of the blue you show up on the board. If you would get the common courtesy (not the quality of Fidesz believers) to research rye blog you would of also seen that our PROVEN experience that there are Fidesz friendly blogs that send their trolls here just to bark in two sentences then they as they came, the same way disappear.
    Let me tell you one single election freud that every intelligent person would understand right away (so I am crossing my fingers here). It was posted about five times by now, so I never now…
    Although there are plenty of voting locations are set up close to some outside the border voters (as close as 5 km), still some of those voters are able to mail in their vote. Other voters from outside the border would have to travel around 4000km to cast their vote.
    Although I did fill out my voting request, I never received a reply, so from my personal point of view, I was cheated out of my right to vote!
    How about Fidesz overspending their election campaign? That is a freud too.
    How about Fidesz free transportation for Peace March / COF that is filled with election material.
    THere are hundreds of new so called “voting tourists” that miraculously registered in their new address in the two-chance districts, and there is no demographic explanation.
    There will no investigation held about the fake parties that registered, and there will no investigation about the names traded by the fake parties.
    “Volt egy dongó,
    meg egy légy,
    tovább is van,
    mondjam még? ”
    (The above is a well liked rhyme by Tamko Sirato Karoly. Each verse finishes with the same two lines,
    “there is more
    should I go on?”

  24. Eva S. Balogh :
    Rumor or not rumor? Well, I heard it straight from Gergely Bárándy. The MSZP candidate in the district will ask for investigation. Of course, it still can be a rumor. We will see.

    My conclusion was that if the rumor is true then they falsify or do not update the “cross vote” numbers, which is not impossible.

    Registered “cross voters”:

    2014-04-02.: 80,570
    2010. 1st round: 57,566
    2006. 1st round: 47,605
    2002. 1st round: 43,169

    2010. 2nd round: 46,156
    2006. 2nd round: 25,312
    2002. 2nd round: 22,692

    Number of people eligible to vote inside Hungary

    2014-04-02 : 8 020 376
    2010.1st round: 8 069 970
    2006 1st round: 8 038 017
    2002.1st round: 8 061 101

    2010. 2nd round: 8 074 382
    2006 2nd round: 5 053 058
    2002. 2nd round: 6 018 069

    Number of people registered to vote abroad at consulates or embassies

    2014-04-02.: 28 158
    2010. 1st round: 8 807
    2006. 1st round: 8 112

    2010. 2nd round: 8 718
    2006. 2nd round: 5 944

    Number of precincts in Hungary + consulates or embassies

    2014: 10,386 + 97
    2010: 10,926 + 88

  25. @juhika – If Fidesz trolls link this bogus illustration about the relative size of the crowds, I will take the pains debunking it again: the red rectangle in the picture is patently much smaller than the stretch of Andrassy Ave occupied by the opposition rally. This is simply a blatant attempt to suggest a 10-fold difference between the two crowds. Actually, I am getting convinced that the difference may have been much smaller than stated by Fidesz propagandists, somewhere in the two-to-threefold ballpark.

  26. I suggest we give up on Angle Bogazcy or whoever she is. Put her cover name in Google, and follow her comments. lol Jobbik is all good, Gyurcsany is conspired with the Jews, and so forth…..

  27. Some1 :
    @nwo, gdfxx Just some technicality. So if God forbid for some reason Russia would come out of this game winning, then Hungary this time will be on the “good side, winner side”? All it takes is to win and everything is justified?

    No. All I said was that in the past the good won and I hope this would stay that way in the future.

  28. I saw some Fidesz posters put up next to the road today. And a couple of Jobbik ‘news’papers in my letterbox. Is there a minor local election on or something?

  29. gdfxx :

    Some1 :
    @nwo, gdfxx Just some technicality. So if God forbid for some reason Russia would come out of this game winning, then Hungary this time will be on the “good side, winner side”? All it takes is to win and everything is justified?

    No. All I said was that in the past the good won and I hope this would stay that way in the future.

    Fair! Thanks.

  30. tappanch :
    @buddy
    There is historical precedent for everything…
    Szekely land was delineated until 1878, for instance, with well-defined borders.
    Catalunya and Euzkadi in Spain or Navarre in France have established borders.
    Kurdish fiefdoms existed within the Ottoman empire for long time.
    Krajina also has historical precedent : Határőrvidék (Military Frontier) 1711 (?) – 1869
    http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/be/Militargrenze%2C_Wojwodowena_und_Banat.jpg

    That’s interesting. I didn’t know about those borders, but it doesn’t surprise me. Perhaps the issue was that the borders weren’t in use at the time of proposed secession. Obviously the court’s opinion was more nuanced than mine.

  31. Angela Bogazcy :
    @ tappanch: ‘Foreign observers estimated the Fidesz crowd at 100,000. The 450,000 is a Fidesz propaganda number.’
    The estimate 444,000-460,000 is the Interior Ministry’s. You know, don’t you, that it has aerial photos and the estimate of its space-crowd reckoning equipment to substantiate its figures? Your ‘foreign observers’ had neither.

    You don’t need fancy equipment to realize that you can’t put 400,000 people in that space.

  32. wolfi :
    @Ron, ok – you have to consider the total cost vs productivity – but where is Hungary’s advantage then?

    Hungary’s advantage is that they are in the EU. But as far as cost structures go, Hungary is surprisingly expensive almost to the point of being non-competitive with other EU countries. Add in the unstable political environment which creates an unstable legal system and you have the answer as to why investment in Hungary has all but dried up. Just in entrepreneurial spirit Poland and Romania are so far ahead it’s sad….

    As for Hungarians going abroad. The attitude in London is; there are so many Poles here coming from very good Universities why would we hire from else where? Many young adults with good education end up a waiters, waitresses etc… Of course Hungarian agencies that are helping young people find jobs outside of the country are plundering these kids salaries to the point that I believe the wages they receive in most countries would be considered illegal by the relevant local labour authorities.

  33. Wolfi and LwiiH: Both of you are right of course. The situation is becoming more and more catastrophic. On one hand Fidesz is saying that they reduce the taxes, but on the other hand they introduced many new taxes (including the new indirect banking transfer taxes), abolished tax credits (mainly for the economic weaker).

    I wonder what the result of this election is. If there is no 2/3 majority than the country will face an economic, financial, legal and administrative melt down.

  34. juhika :
    Unfortunately there were a lot of desinformation, misinformation and lies about the relative size of the Heroes’ Square Fidesz demonstration and the Opera leftist demonstrations.
    Some facts:
    The press briefing of the organizers of the opera leftist rally themselves only said 35 000 people participated. It is well known that organizers almost always overestimate. Anything more than 35 000 is such a laughable lie that even the organizers themselves did not attempt it!! Bad propaganda!
    http://index.hu/belfold/2014/03/30/bepotolja_marcius_15-ot_az_ellenzek/
    It is fine to estimate crowds but it is not fine to lie about them. If someone estimates a size they must present the calculations that underpin the estimation. Photographs that show the size of the crowd are a must in determining the real size of the crowd.
    http://imgur.com/7cMPNt3
    An estimation is simple how much ground is covered by Heroes Square and nearby streets. It is about 100 000 square meters. But the exact number can be looked up measured. And then we can get a realistic estimate from the pictures. Was there one person per square meter? What does a crowd look like with 1 person per square meter? Is it like in the picture? It doesn’t matter everyone can make their own estimations but they have to be based in fact.
    I would also advise anyone not to fall victim to nazi type thinking. In those times it was assumed that anyone who was a Jew is not credible. These days some people think that anyone who is a Hungarian is automaticly not credible. This is why some people put “foreign” opinions above every and all Hungarian opinions, estimations and writings. By default anything non-Hungarian is more credible to them. But this type of thinking is deeply flawed it was flawed in the 30s and it is flawed now.

    Thank goodness you brought this up. tappanch is Hungarian, I am Hungarian, and so most of the readers of this blog. In fact many of us lived or have been living in Hungary than many who will go on voting and may never stepped inside the borders of current Hungary.
    This means we are not foreign observers. Thanks again to clearing that.
    (you also misinterpreting what Hungarian is. A Hungarain can be a Fidez supporter but that is not mandatory. I know that you literally interpreted what Orban said, but please do not fall into the trap of Hungarians who helped the cattle the Jews in wwii as per yur reference.)
    Now back to the area covered by the Fidesz paid supporters.
    THe area is about 20000 m² (and I am being generous) 4 x 20,000 = 80,000 people. Lets’ double that.

    http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm

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