Viktor Orbán is up to something and that something is nothing good

Index came out with it first. It seems that feelers are being put out, most likely indirectly by the prime minister’s office, about people’s opinion of changing the Hungarian governmental structure from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential system. The client who ordered the survey seems to be specifically interested in whom people would like to see in the post of president.

A few months ago Péter Hack, a former member of parliament and a constitutional lawyer, called the topic of Viktor Orbán as the next president “an evergreen subject” which has been around for at least twenty-five years. Indeed, the topic was hotly debated during the discussions of the opposition in 1989. If it had depended on MDF, a right of center party, the president would have been directly elected by the voters, and they even had their favorite candidate, former member of the Politburo Imre Pozsgay. Fidesz and SZDSZ managed to thwart that plan and Hungary remained a purely parliamentary system in which the president has little power and is elected by the parliament.

After the 1989-1990 debate no one brought up the desirability of changing the constitutional order until 2004 when István Stumpf talked about the advantages of such a system. Four years later in a television interview he specifically spoke of the possibility that Viktor Orbán could become president one day, but naturally only if “the presidency would be reinforced.” Surely, a mostly ceremonial role would not suit Viktor Orbán’s temperament and political ambitions.

As usual, Viktor Orbán changed his mind on the subject frequently. In the fall of 2009 he declared that he is a devotee of the parliamentary system, which has a long tradition in Hungary. Yet when in 2010, after the election, a preliminary committee was assembled to write a new constitution, a change to a semi-presidential system was envisaged. As you may recall, that preliminary constitutional draft was thrown out the window so to speak, and instead the final text was written by József Szájer on his iPad on the train between Budapest and Brussels.

So, in the new constitution that was adopted in 2011 there was no mention of enlarged presidential powers. Yet we know that Orbán preferred the semi-presidential system, as he made clear in a speech delivered in the same year. There was a simple reason he did not agree to the change in the constitution: the timing was not right. No wonder that he vetoed the text of the preliminary committee working on the constitution. Viktor Orbán is no fool. He certainly did not want the immediate introduction of a strong presidency over and above himself.

But the future was something else. In 2012 he gave an interview to the German Handelsblatt in which he praised the advantages of the semi-presidential system which “is more suited for the introduction of difficult reforms.” He added that he is a devotee  of democracy, but the question should be asked whether the management structures of democracy are best for periods of crisis.

It looks as if Orbán now finds the time ripe for making a move toward a presidential system. On May 21 Népszabadság reported that Orbán discussed the possibility of occupying the post of presidency after János Áder leaves in 2017. But he emphasized that he would do so only if the president had real power. As we know, under the present circumstances, changing the constitution and declaring the president head of the government as well as head of the state is a question of only a couple of hours of phony debate in parliament and the deed is done. For that matter, if Viktor Orbán decided to transform Hungary into a constitutional monarchy he would have no difficulty with his super majority of mindless followers.

Viktor Orbán’s mask in the Institute for the Blind

So, what is a semi-presidential system? There are several countries where such a governmental structure exists, but perhaps the best known is post-1958 France. In this system the government is not only responsible to parliament but also to the president. It is the president who appoints the prime minister, so he is the most important political player in the land. The president’s choice of prime minister, however, depends on the composition of the parliament. It can easily happen that the prime minister belongs to one party and the president to another. In this case they split responsibilities. Normally, the president is responsible for foreign policy and the prime minister for domestic policy. This “division of labor” is not spelled out in the constitution; it simply evolved this way. But often the system does not work. There can be bitter and tense stonewalling, depending on the attitudes of the two leaders and the ideologies of their parties. Just think what would happen if Viktor Orbán were president and Ferenc Gyurcsány prime minister.

How do we know that Viktor Orbán is seriously contemplating changing the constitution in order to move over to the Sándor palota, the office of the president? A few weeks ago ATV, the only television station that represents the views of the opposition, learned that Forsense Institute, a polling company that receives many government orders, conducted a survey on the Hungarian people’s attitudes on the subject. It was a telephone survey lasting about 10-15 minutes. On June 26 the station inquired whether such a survey had taken place. At that time Forsense denied the existence of such a poll. Yesterday, however, Forsense fessed up and admitted the existence of the survey to a journalist from Index. They refused to divulge the name of the client who ordered it, but they insisted that it was not the prime minister’s office. I tend to agree. Hungary’s prime minister is far too clever to get involved directly with such an enterprise. Most likely the job was “outsourced” to someone else.

What did the pollsters want to know? Index learned that the subjects were asked very specific questions. For example, what kind of a president they would prefer if they had a choice: Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, or Silvio Berlusconi? Whom would they prefer? Viktor Orbán, János Áder, László Sólyom, or Gordon Bajnai? They wanted their opinion on whether the president’s tenure should be seven or nine years. The pollsters were especially interested in people’s political and religious views: the subjects had to divulge for which party they voted at the national and the EP elections.

It is alarming that decisions might be made on the basis of such a survey. The Hungarian voters’ knowledge of politics is frighteningly limited. How many people know the differences between the German, the Russian, the American, or the Italian system of government? How can they decide?

But the most frightening part of this latest news is that Viktor Orbán seems to be contemplating a radical change in Hungary’s constitutional order and placing himself, most likely for nine years, at the head of the government hierarchy. More than scary.

Viktor Orbán’s speech in parliament, May 10, 2014

Viktor Orbán had a very busy weekend. He was in Berlin on the 8th where he had a brief conversation with Chancellor Angela Merkel and delivered a lecture at a conference on the future of the European Union. Two days later, on the 10th, he was sworn in as prime minister of Hungary and delivered two speeches, one to the members of parliament and another to a sizable audience recruited by party activists.

I would like to concentrate here on the longest speech of the three, the one he delivered in parliament. In this speech he sought to portray himself as the prime minister of the whole nation. By contrast, the speech that followed, delivered only a few hours later, was entitled “We must go to war again!” It was an antagonistic campaign speech for the European parliamentary election. Such rapid switches in Orbán’s messages are by now expected.

Not that the first speech was devoid of military references. Orbán described Fidesz’s election campaign as a “military expedition” that produced fabulous results. Some people want to belittle this achievement, he said, by talking about the jarring difference between the number of votes cast for Fidesz and the number of seats the party received in parliament. But he considers the result a true expression of the popular will and a reaffirmation of his leadership. It reflects (perhaps in a fun house mirror) the Hungarian people’s centuries-long striving for freedom and independence.

After assuring his audience that he will be the prime minister of all Hungarians, even those who did not vote for Fidesz, he shared his views on the politics of the first twenty years of Hungarian democracy and outlined what he would consider a desirable state of affairs in Hungarian politics under his guidance. The upshot of it is that Hungarians had too much freedom between 1990 and 2010. After 40 years of silence, suddenly everybody wanted to discuss and argue and, as a result, “we didn’t get anywhere.” Hungarian politics didn’t find the right proportion between discussion, argument, compromise, and action. But now that the Hungarian people have overwhelmingly voted for his politics, “it is time to close the period of unproductive debates.” Since he won the election twice, “the Fundamental Law, a society built on human dignity, politics that couples freedom with responsibility, a work-based society and unification of nation are no longer the subjects of debate.” One can talk about details but “the basic questions have been decided. The electorate put an end to debate.”

Members of the democratic opposition are absent
Source: MTI/ Lajos Soós

We know from his earlier utterances that Orbán values national unity above all, but here he admitted that the much coveted unity cannot be fully achieved. The culprit? Democracy. He recognizes that democratic principles preclude “complete national unity.” He quickly added, however, that “the forces that are striving for unity scored an overwhelming victory at the polls, meaning the central forces were victorious.”  He considers this huge mass of people the “European center, which rejects extremist politics.”

At the very beginning of the speech Orbán devoted a short paragraph to the importance of proper word usage. If the choice of words is wrong, the thoughts behind them are muddled. The implication was that his way of expressing himself is crystal clear with no room for misunderstanding. Unfortunately, his discourse on democracy versus national unity is anything but clear and logical. So, let’s try to unravel the tangle.

It seems to me that he is trying to show that democracy and national unity are compatible after all. Since Fidesz won a landslide victory and those who voted for him belong to the political center (a group that stands against both right and left extremism), they embody the notion of national unity. Extremists have no place in the nation because “they pose a danger to Hungarians.” A rather neat way of justifying a basically autocratic, non-democratic system within the framework of a supposedly democratic regime.

Who are these extremists? If you think that he was talking about Jobbik you would be wrong. He talked mostly about the liberals. People who defend the rights of the accused at the expense of victims’ rights are extremists. Extremists are those who “take money away from working people and give it to those who are capable of working but who don’t want to work.” Extremists are those who “want to support the unemployed instead of the employed.” An extremist is a person “who wants to sacrifice our one-thousand-year-old country on the altar of some kind of United States of Europe.” (A clear reference to Ferenc Gyurcsány.) For Orbán, it seems, the socialists and liberals are just as extreme as the politicians of Jobbik who “want to leave the European Union.”  In fact, he spends far more time on the sins of the liberals than on those of Jobbik, whose only offense seems to be their desire to turn their backs on the European Union. Of course, Orbán himself would be a great deal happier if he could get rid of the Brussels bureaucrats who poke their noses into his affairs, but he knows that without the EU Hungary would have been bankrupt a long time ago.

As for his “program,” we know that before the election Orbán did not offer a party program. Fidesz simply announced that they “will continue” what they did in the last four years. The guiding principles will remain the same: Christianity, family values, patriotism, and a work-based society. Orbán is against immigration from outside of Europe and instead wants to promote large Hungarian families. He makes no bones about what he thinks of same-sex marriages. We’ve heard these themes before; they’re not worth dwelling on here.

I would, however, like to point out one delicious “messaging shift”  in this speech. You may recall that Viktor Orbán time and again called the 1989 constitution, which was a thorough rewrite of the 1948 constitution, a Stalinist constitution. Fidesz politicians liked to say that Hungary was the only EU country that still had a “communist” constitution. So, what do I see in this speech? The following sentence: “The liberal constitution did not obligate the government to the service of national interests;  it did not oblige it to recognize and strengthen the community of Hungarians living all over the world; it did not defend the nation’s common property; it did not shelter the people from the indebtedness and the pillage of the country.”  Wow, so the problem was that it was a liberal constitution! Now we understand.

When Viktor Orbán is honest: The Hungarian constitution is not a liberal document

It was only today that I managed to find more than an hour to listen to Viktor Orbán’s speech to the honorary consuls who gather every five years in Budapest to reinforce their ties to the country they serve. An honorary consul doesn’t have to be a Hungarian national. For example, I learned that an American professor who teaches in a nearby college in Connecticut just became an honorary consul. Apparently Hungary has honorary consuls in 100 countries, only 54 of which have official Hungarian consular service. In the United States there are 18-19 honorary consuls strategically placed in different parts of the country.

The event took place on September 18 in the chamber that was the home of the Hungarian Upper House before World War II. By all descriptions the consuls found the prime minister’s speech elevating and, although his speech was not interrupted by periodic applause, at the end the audience gave Orbán a standing ovation.

The speech in some ways was quite remarkable. It was a curious combination of surprising honesty and unsurprising falsehood. I doubt that too many people in attendance comprehended the full significance of what they heard.

What did Orbán want to accomplish with this speech? To provide the honorary consuls with ammunition to defend Hungary against foreign criticism. Or at least to explain away Hungary’s bad press in the international media as based on misconceptions. He admitted that these consuls most likely had a hard time in the last three years. Hungarian nationals see their own country differently from those who look at Hungary from the outside. But he offered a few fundamental facts that might make the consuls’ work easier.

First, Orbán tried to explain his government’s position vis-à-vis the European Union. Ignoring the fact that in the last years his anti-European Union speeches have multiplied and become increasingly antagonistic, he tried to convince his audience that he and his government are not euro-skeptics. They are only euro-realists. During the course of the speech it became crystal clear that Hungary has no intention of joining the eurozone and thus adopting the euro as Hungary’s currency. Of course, Hungary is required to join the eurozone eventually, despite the fact that the new constitution includes the statement that “Hungary’s currency is the forint.” Since Hungary is obligated to join the eurozone, avoiding this obligation can be accomplished only by leaving the European Union.

There was another issue about which he was brutally honest. He told his audience that the new Hungarian constitution is not a liberal document because, in his opinion, “a liberal constitution cannot be the basis of the economic renewal of the country.” He admitted that this is “a strong statement, perhaps even debatable,” but this new Hungary he is building cannot be founded on a constitution that emphasizes “the interests of the individuals.” This is a fact that he will not hide from all those countries whose constitutions are based on liberal concepts. One day other countries will come to realize that indeed a “new economic system” cannot be built on a liberal basis. He categorically stated that economic competition and liberalism are incompatible.

He admitted that questioning the validity of individual rights might have given rise to harsh international criticism and huge debates, but Orbán proudly announced that he managed to prevent such adverse reactions by “a political novum” called “national consultation.” I assume you all remember those 13-14 meaningless questionnaires sent out to 8 million Hungarian citizens. One of these inquired about the relationship between the rights of individuals and the rights of the community; 85% of those who answered agreed that both should be included in the new constitution. With that he avoided possible controversy over the new illiberal constitution, or at least so he said.

What can we learn from this speech about Hungary’s breakthrough economic system? Nothing new. Hungary will not be a welfare state but a workfare state. Hungary will handle the economic crisis differently from the rest of the world. Common wisdom holds that after an economic crisis there will be a slow recovery and that as an economy starts to recover investment will grow and with it job opportunities. The Hungarian solution will be the opposite of this sequence of events. They will start with work which will eventually solve the economic crisis. I don’t think that I have tell you how fallacious this argument is. If there is no private investment and the state doesn’t have money, as Orbán admitted in this speech, then only useless public work can be provided. And digging roadside drains financed by public money will never amount to anything. Orbán invoked the example of Roosevelt, but anyone familiar with economic history knows that the end of the Great Depression in the United States wasn’t brought about by FDR’s public work projects.

As I said at the beginning, the speech was a combination of brutal honesty and outright lies. Here are a few lies. In 2010 Hungary was in a worse economic state than Greece. Since then Hungary’s economic policy has been most successful. In the European Union only five countries managed to lower their national debt and Hungary is one of them. This, of course, is not true. In fact, the national debt has grown. It is true that the excessive deficit procedure was lifted by Brussels against Hungary, but the budget is so tight that there is a good possibility that Hungary will not be able to hold the 2.9% deficit currently projected. He repeated the lie that before 2010 only 1.8 million people paid taxes and now there are 4 million. And, not a lie but a conveniently undated forecast, Hungary will be the leading economic force in the region just as it was ten years ago.

And finally, a few interesting comments from the Q&A session. This is always the time that Orbán improvises and comes up with some interesting “facts.” All cities east of Strasbourg are “German cities.” Like, for example, Vienna, Prague, and and even St. Petersburg. There is only one exception: Budapest. The same Budapest where the majority of the population as late as the second half of the nineteenth century was largely German-speaking? Where first there was a German theater and only afterwards a Hungarian theater?

His thoughts on networking were also amusing. For Hungarians networking is a strange idea because what is networking really? Hungarians are friendly and hospitable, but networking is based on “calculation.” One does something for somebody in order to get something in return. This is really alien to the Hungarian psyche. But the world went a different way and, although it is nice to be old-fashioned occasionally, yes, Hungarians must learn the art of networking.

One final word on Orbán’s illiberal constitution. Yesterday, Károly Herényi, the second man in the Ibolya Dávid-led MDF, wrote an article in Galamus. Here is a man who is not considered to be a far-left liberal. On the contrary. He was a member of a moderate right-of-center party. And what does he say? There is no way that Orbán’s constitution can stay after a (possible) victory by the democratic forces. It must go. He considers any attempt by Gordon Bajnai to make a deal with Viktor Orbán a mistake. He suggests holding a referendum on the constitution right after the election to decide its fate.  I agree with him.

What does the Demokratikus Koalíció stand for?

On September 3, I wrote about an opinion piece by Tamás Bauer, vice-chairman of the Demokratikus Koalíció. Its title was “Electoral mathematics: The Demokratikus Koalíció’s position.” Bauer argued for DK’s right, based on its numerical support, to receive at least 8 or 9 electoral districts. He added that DK’s positions on many issues differ from those of both MSZP and Együtt2014-PM and therefore it deserves a parliamentary caucus.

At the end of that post I indicated that I would like to return to DK’s political program because relatively few people are familiar with it. I had to postpone that piece due to DK’s very prompt answer to MSZP. On the next day, September 4, I posted an article entitled “The current state of the Hungarian opposition: Negotiations between MSZP and DK.”

Over the last few days it has become obvious to me that Ferenc Gyurcsány has already begun his election campaign.  Zsolt Gréczy’s appointment as DK spokesman signaled the beginning of the campaign, which was then followed by several personal appearances by Ferenc Gyurcsány where he began to outline his program. Surely, the amusing video on being a tour guide in Felcsút, “the capital of Orbanistan,” was part of this campaign. So, it’s time to talk about the party program of the Demokratikus Koalíció, especially since only yesterday Attila Mesterházy answered Ferenc Gyurcsány’s letter to him. I elaborated on that letter in my September 4 post.

You may remember that one of the sticking points between the two parties was whether DK is ready to have “an electoral alliance” as opposed to “a political alliance.” Gyurcsány in his letter to Mesterházy made light of the difference between the two, but as far as the socialists are concerned this is an important distinction. Yesterday Attila Mesterházy made that crystal clear in his answer to  Gyurcsány which he posted on his own webpage. According to him, a “political alliance” means the complete subordination of individual parties’ political creeds to the agreed upon policies.  In plain language, DK “will have to agree not to represent its own political ideas during the campaign.”

Since DK’s program thus became one of the central issues in the negotiations it is time to see in what way DK’s vision of the future differs from that of MSZP and Együtt 2014-PM. Here I’m relying on Tamás Bauer’s list of the main differences.

(1) An MSZP and Együtt 2014-PM alliance following an electoral victory will only amend the new constitution and the cardinal laws that are based on this new constitution. The Demokratikus Koalíció, on the other hand, holds that the new constitution is illegitimate because it was enacted without the participation of the opposition. Therefore, according to DK, the new constitution must be repealed and the constitution of the Republic must take its place.

(2) MSZP-E14 by and large accepts the policy of Viktor Orbán on national matters and would allow people living outside of the borders to vote in national elections. The Demokratikus Koalíció rejects this new law and would put an end to these new citizens’ voting rights.

(3) MSZP-E14 does not seem to concern itself with the relation of church and state or the Orbán government’s law on churches. DK would restore the religious neutrality of the state and would initiate a re-examination of the agreement that was concluded between Hungary and the Vatican or, if the Church does not agree to such a re-examination, DK would abrogate the agreement altogether.

(4) MSZP-E14 talks in generalities about the re-establishment of predictable economic conditions and policies that would be investment friendly but it doesn’t dare to reject such populist moves as a decrease in utility prices or the nationalization of companies. Only DK is ready to openly reject all these.

(5) MSZP-E14 accepts the tax credits that depend on the number of children and therefore supports an unjust system. DK, on the other hand, wants to put an end to this system and to introduce a system that treats all children alike.

(6) Együtt2014-PM opposes the concentration of land that is necessary for the creation of  a modern and effective agriculture. The policy of small landholdings was the brainchild of the Smallholders Party, which was largely responsible for the collapse of Hungarian agriculture after the change of regime. MSZP is against foreign investment in Hungarian agriculture. The Demokratikus Koalíció intends to liberalize the agricultural market. DK thinks that agricultural cooperatives should be able to purchase the land they currently cultivate. It also maintains that foreign capital should be able to come into Hungary in order to make Hungarian agriculture competitive again.

(7) The attitude of MSZP and Együtt 2014-PM toward the conflicts between the European Union and the Orbán government is ambiguous, while the Demokratikus Koalíció unequivocally takes the side of the institutions of the Union against the Orbán government.

These are the points that Tamás Bauer mentions. But as the Gyurcsány campaign unfolds more and more differences will be visible. For example, only yesterday Gyurcsány talked about his ideas to abolish the compulsory retirement age and to financially encourage people to demand higher wages in order to maximize their pensions after retirement. During this talk in Nyíregyháza Gyurcsány made no secret of the fact that his party is working on its election program.

So, it seems to me that the Gyurcsány campaign has already begun. Maybe I’m wrong and Gyurcsány will give up all his ideas and will line up behind MSZP-E14, but somehow I doubt it. Even if he tried, he couldn’t. Temperamentally he is not suited for it.

Meanwhile, an interesting but naturally not representative voting has been taking place in Magyar Narancs. Readers of the publication are asked to vote for party and for leader of the list. DK leads (52%) over Együtt 2014 (29%) and Gyurcsány (54%) over Bajnai (32%). Of course, this vote in no way reflects reality. What it does tell us is that the majority of readers of Magyar Narancs are DK supporters. Something that surprised me. If I had had to guess, I would have picked Együtt2014.

As for Ferenc Gyurcsány’s visit to Felcsút, I wrote about it a couple of days ago. The video is now out. This morning I decided to take a look at it because from Zsolt Gréczy’s description on ATV’s Egyenes beszéd the whole scene of Fidesz cameras following them everywhere sounded hilarious . At that time the video had been viewed by about 5,000 people. Right now the number of visitors is over 53,000.

Clips from The Godfather are juxtaposed with scenes from Felcsút. The video ends with the wedding of Vito Corleone’s daughter. While Gyurcsány is narrating the enrichment of the Orbán family, two people, one of whom is the Fidesz regional secretary and the other perhaps the cameraman of the Puskás Academy, follow him everywhere and record his every move and word. Definitely worth seven minutes of your time.

Since I am no fortune teller I have no idea what will happen. A couple of things, though, I’m pretty sure of. DK will never agree to drop Gyurcsány as their party leader. And Mesterházy indicated that this might be one of the MSZP demands for an agreement. Or at least that Gyurcsány not be DK’s top candidate, or possibly any candidate. Otherwise why would he have asked: “Are those media predictions that the Demokratikus Koalíció plans to nominate the chairman of the party, Ferenc Gyurcsány, for the second slot on the list true?”

At first reading I didn’t notice this linguistic oddity. The letter is addressed to “Dear Mr. Party Chairman, dear Feri” and continues in the second-person singular: “te.” Now that I returned to the sentence in order to translate it, suddenly I noticed that Mesterházy switched from “te,” which in a personal letter would have been normal, to “Ferenc Gyurcsány” in a letter addressed to Ferenc Gyurcsány.

What will the final result be? I have no idea. Let’s put it this way, it’s much easier to predict the outcome of Hungarian soccer matches than the outcome of opposition politics.

Maiming the Hungarian constitution: Is the Orbán government willing to pay the price?

While opposition politicians are unable to agree on any meaningful joint action and the so-called intellectual class is deeply divided, the Orbán government is merrily proceeding with its plans to rewrite the new constitution. According to constitutional experts, if the latest amendments are voted into law Hungary will be without a valid constitution.

There was only one group that was ready to take things into their own hands. They decided to engage in civil disobedience. Since ordinary opposition gatherings are not even reported in the public media, tightly controlled by the government, they decided to do something that was guaranteed to get media coverage. They climbed a fence and settled in the courtyard of the Fidesz party headquarters. There they sat  for ten hours and repeated a few slogans. Mostly: “Constitution, Freedom” and “We protest the destruction of the constitutional system of the Hungarian Republic.”

The organizers of the Peace March, András Bencsik and Zsolt Bayer, immediately counterattacked. On Facebook they called on their followers to come and teach a thing or two to these little “Bolsheviks.” And they arrived. Someone described “the fruitful political dialogue” this way:

Youngsters: “We protest the destruction of the constitutional system of the Hungarian Republic.” And here are some of the answers from “the peace guardists”: “Do you want to have some acid in your face?” “Get lost and work!” “I’ll slap you on the face, you rat!” “Rotten, lousy communist stooge!” “Go to Moscow!” “Filthy f…ing Jews!” “Stupid fag!” “Come on out, if you dare, you little queers!”  That will give you an idea about the Fidesz fans who gathered in the name of Christian love and peace.

Here is our gentleman who threatened a young man with acid:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpR87Bjqe2M

Perhaps the officials inside the building no longer trust the police because they were ordered to retire after a while. “Volunteers”  arrived to save the building and those inside it from the peaceful demonstrators. Most of them came from the notorious Fradi (Ferencváros) fan club. One of the volunteers spent ten years in jail for murder and now serves as a “coordinator” for the fan club. The football hooligans physically tried to remove the protesters. Eventually the demonstrators left on their own but not before some of them climbed a wall and positioned themselves on a balcony. The clever student leaders began reciting Fidesz’s 1989 party program which was full of liberal demands. The counter-protesters naturally had no idea that what they were screaming at was really Victor Orbán, their idol.

Older women were especially vocal. They simply couldn’t understand what the protesters were complaining about. How can they be dissatisfied when at last the country has a “good government”? One woman, obviously a pensioner, claimed that it is her money that these students are wasting.

One really has to be deaf and blind to claim that the small crowd that gathered in the courtyard of the Fidesz headquarters was “rabble” as Péter Boros, prime minister of Hungary for a few months after József Antall’s death in 1993-1994, did. Interestingly enough, he had nothing to say about the behavior of the counter-protesters. One can get a vivid picture of the Fidesz crowd by watching this video:

But perhaps the most shocking and most telling example of the mindset of the peace marchers and Orbán supporters is a very professionally executed banner. On it one can see practically all the important MSZP politicians in addition to Ferenc Gyurcsány, Gordon Bajnai, Lajos Bokros, and András Simor. The banner reads: “The nation is in mourning! It suffers from the presence of traitors.”  In Hungarian it has even more punch: “Gyászol a nemzet! Hazaárulóktól szenved!”  Just think about this horrendous statement. I don’t know whether the people actually know what they are saying, because from this banner it is clear that what they want is a one-party system. The opposition has no right to exist. In fact, they should be eliminated as traitors used to be. Perhaps hanged.

The nation is in mourning! It is suffering from the presence of traitors / Népszabadság Árpád Kurucz

Yesterday’s protest was laudable in many ways. Take, for instance, the poise and dignity of the protesters. As you can see on the video, the young man didn’t lose his cool despite repeated physical and verbal abuse. Second, their protest lasted over ten hours. At the beginning they were alone, but once word got out about the gathering others joined them. By the time the demonstrators decided to walk over to the building of the Constitutional Court their numbers had swelled to about 1,000. By contrast, the counter-demonstrators got tired of screaming and their numbers decreased fairly rapidly.

The football hooligans of Gábor Kubatov’s Ferencváros football team, I think we can now say with conviction, are in the employ of Fidesz. Not necessarily in the sense of having paid positions but in being ready to assist “their party”  if necessary. Certainly, someone from the building called on them. One can’t help thinking of the storming of the public television station by Fradi football hooligans.

And finally, the protesters are determined to continue their fight for democracy, the constitution, and the rule of law. Moreover, they seem to have realized that without parties they cannot be successful. At their next demonstration tomorrow parties are welcome.

And, in a critical turn of events, the European Union and the Council of Europe are also waking up to the harsh reality in Hungary. I already wrote about German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Link’s warning letter in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung a few days ago. I was sure at that time that something was brewing in Germany. And, indeed, today ” in a statement reflecting deep seated anxiety at the direction Orbán is taking Hungary, Germany and three other EU countries called for Brussels to be given new power allowing it to freeze EU budget funds to a member state in breach of Europe’s ‘fundamental values.'” The three other countries are the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland. Since then we found out from the spokesman of the European Commission that José Manuel Barroso phoned Viktor Orbán this morning and warned the Hungarian prime minister that the proposed changes in the Hungarian constitution are not only incompatible with the rule of law but also might violate laws of the European Union. Following the conversation Barroso sent a letter in which he summarized the points he made during the telephone conversation.

I should also mention that today we learned that President János Ader will be in Berlin on Monday and Tuesday next week. On Monday he will meet President Joachim Gauck. Tuesday his first trip will be to Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle followed by a conversation with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Some might say that this trip was arranged some time ago and has nothing to do with the current brouhaha over the Hungarian constitution. Perhaps, but I find it odd that the president of Hungary has an appointment with the German foreign minister. I doubt that this is normal protocol. My hunch is that although the trip might have been arranged earlier, the meeting with Westerwelle was added only recently. But this is only a guess on my part.

The Hungarian Socialist Party’s critique of the latest amendments to Hungary’s new constitution

On February 8, Antal Rogán and Péter Harrach, leaders of the Fidesz and KDNP factions respectively, submitted the Fourth Amendment to the Basic Law of Hungary (proposal # T/9929). The overwhelming majority of representatives from the governing parties signed the document. The proposal was penned in the name of all majority MPs. The Fourth Amendment will be effective one month after it was passed.

Hungary’s Basic Law was supposed to be carved in stone

This amendment is characterized by, in addition to a few minor corrections in wording intended to improve coherence, the current administration’s desire to further destroy the constitutional limits for the exercise of power.

Through this proposal, in addition to further curbing the powers of the Constitutional Court, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition is now including all elements in the country’s constitution which were, in part, declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court or were featured in the Temporary Provisions of the Basic Law of Hungary.

This document summarizes the most important elements of the Fourth Amendment. However, first we must briefly familiarize ourselves with the Constitutional Court’s 45/2012 (XII/ 29) decision regarding the unconstitutionality of certain sections of the Provisions of the Basic Law of Hungary.

At the initiative of the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights, the Constitutional Court opined that a significant portion of the Temporary Provisions was unconstitutional. The Court stated that the Temporary Provisions cannot be accepted as a part or an amendment of the Basic Law with regards to the document’s themes and content. Furthermore, it was decided that the Provisions, considering the time span which they cover, undermined the Basic Law’s uniformity and structure.

The Court struck down the following provisions:

The preamble which condemns MSZP, the Hungarian Socialist Party

Article 1 –  On decreasing the pensions of “guilty persons”

Article 2 – On the inability of communist crimes to expire

Article 3 – On the establishment of the Committee of National Memory and the publication of communist documents

Article 4 – On the duty of communist leaders and public actors to tolerate all opinions formed about their persons

Article 11, paragraphs (3) and (4) – On the ability of the president of the National Judicial Office (Orszagos Birosagi Hivatal – OBH) and the Chief Prosecutor to move cases to other courts as they see fit

Article 12 – On the deadlines for judges’ mandatory retirement

Article 13 – On the deadlines for prosecutors’ mandatory retirement

Article 18 – On a member of the Budgetary Council being the President-appointed chair of that body

Article 21 – On the National Assembly’s ability to regulate and determine recognized churches in a cardinal law and determine recognized nationalities

Article 22 – On the definition of a constitutional complaint

Article 23 paragraphs (1) and (3)-(5) – On setting the date for the election of local government representatives for October 2014 and laying down the preliminary electoral rules

Article 27 – Further restricts the Constitutional Court’s competencies by extending limitations to periods when the national debt threshold is not surpassed.

Article 28 paragraph (3) – The office of the government can turn to the courts if a local government fails to make decisions in areas defined by law. The office of the government is even allowed to make up for the absent resolution.

Article 29 – A special approval is necessary to fulfill the state’s payment obligations arising out of unconstitutional or unlawful legislation.

Article 31 – On making the Temporary Provisions part of the Basic Law

Article 32 – On making April 25 Basic Law Day

While it’s important to note that the Constitutional Court nullified elements of the Temporary Provisions due to form-related constitutional issues, the body quoted several previous decisions, emphasizing that “stepping over the boundaries of legislation results in unconstitutionality” and that “formal unconstitutionalities are, coincidentally, violations of the standards for the rule of law.”

The Constitutional Court indicated that it could alter the interpretation applied in previous exercise of its competencies, namely that it did not subject the contents of the Basic Law to review (because that would result in interfering with the jurisdiction of a constitutionalizing power). However, “procedural, formal, and public law requirements are not the only factors of constitutional legality – there are also content-related criteria. The standards for a democratic state ruled by law include not only values, principles, and rights discussed in international agreements and accepted by the democratic community, but also so-called peremptory norms. In certain cases the Constitutional Court is allowed to examine the uninhibited application of the constitutional guarantees and values of the rule of law.”

It is completely obvious that the formal necessity for the inclusion of the Temporary Provisions in the Fourth Amendment of the Basic Law and the Constitutional Court’s decisions which defied the government’s objectives overrode the symbolic steps accompanying the passage of the Basic Law.

We will now introduce the alterations without political evaluations.

1. The amendment states that the bases for familial relations are marriage and the parent-child relationship.

When reviewing the currently applicable Article L of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court decided, after examining decision 43/2012. (XII. 20) on articles 7 and 8 of Act CCXI of 2011 concerning the protection of families, that “by considering marriage as a value […] the legislator –  while accepting the right of the individual to pursue happiness within a relationship of their personal preference, keeping in mind social trends and needs and the transformation of a traditional family configuration–does not exclude other chosen forms of relationships, which are similar to marriage, from the protection of the law. The duty to protect institutions cannot hinder the extension of rights in an open and democratic society, otherwise this would not be compatible with the spirit of the Basic Law.” (ABH 2010, 194, 208)

According to the Court, the constitutional protection of families extends to both marriage and socially (emotionally) based relationships. Previously the Constitutional Court decided that Act CCXI of 2011 defines “family” too narrowly. The currently applicable Basic Law contains no indication that partnerships with common goals, mutual care, and long-term economic and emotional commitment do not enjoy the protection of the law. If the legislator wants to create laws which regulate the rights and duties of family, he or she cannot do so at the expense of those who wish to form families based on alternative economic and emotional relationships and cannot diminish the legal status of such relationships. Furthermore, the state’s duty to protect the institutions of family and marriage cannot lead to direct or indirect discrimination of the children due to their parents’ relationship. As such, the Constitutional Court decided that compared to the Basic Law, Act CCXI’s wording was too restrictive and struck down its Article 7. In the justification, the judges cite the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In 2010, that body declared that the existence of family is primarily factual: if people live together, they can be considered family despite their legal status and/or gender.

The Constitutional Court also decided that from now on the fundamental laws of inheritance will be guided by the Civil Code. Registered couples are to enjoy the same inheritance privileges as those who are officially married. Act CCXI, on the other hand, conveniently ignores such a specification. The laws governing inheritance have to be precise and clear. Because of this, the Constitutional Court decided that the contradictions contained in the review provisions are too significant for dissolution through executive legal interpretations, and as such, they were sure to violate the notion of legal certainty. The court subsequently threw out Article 8 due to incoherence between the Civil Code and the Basic Law.

The new Civil Code awaits a final National Assembly vote as proposal T/7971. On December 17, 2012, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition accepted a series of legislative amendments which make substantial differences between marriage and cohabitative romantic relationships in terms of family law. Romantic partnerships will be part of the “BOOK OF OBLIGATIONS” (“Kötelmi könyv”) instead of the “BOOK OF FAMILY LAW” (Családjogi könyv). With this, a cohabitative romantic partnership will simply be a contractual relationship. The new Civil Code does not deal with registered cohabitative partnership at all. By the force of law, such a relationship will only carry any sort of legal meaning if the relationship has been in effect for one year and the couple has at least one child together.

The Fourth Amendment to the Basic Law constitutionalizes families as ties based on marriage and the parent-child relationship. Partners cannot form a family even if they have a common child. Their familial relations can only be recognized separately with their own children.

2. The amendment adds Article U, which cements communist crimes not simply in the Preamble but in the very body of the Basic Law.

Basically the complete contents of the Temporary Provisions, which were struck down by the Constitutional Court, have been lifted into the fundamental principles of the Basic Law with minor structural changes. These include, in addition to the list of crimes, the extension of punitive measures, and the stigmatization of criminals, the establishment of the Committee of National Memory (Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága). This body is supposed to uncover the past and publish related documents.

According to the text, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), its legal predecessors, and other associated political organizations are criminal in nature. Naturally, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) is also mentioned: “as an heirs to unlawfully accumulated wealth, organizations which emerged as legal successors to the MSZMP during the democratic transition also share the responsibility of their predecessors.”

Paragraph (3) of Article T of the Basic Law states that a legislation cannot contradict the Basic Law. The Basic Law’s Preamble records that the Basic Law is the foundation of legal order in Hungary. Paragraph (1) of Article R reaffirms this with a normative rule and states that the Basic Law is the basis for the country’s legal system. According to paragraph (2) of Article R, the Basic Law and legislations are obligatory for all.

3. This means that any legislation in the Hungarian legal system can order the prosecution of the leading Leftist party due to its shared responsibility for communist crimes. The amendment creates a foundation for the provisions of the cardinal law concerning churches in a manner which utilizes parts of the discarded text of the Temporary Provisions.

The National Assembly continues to have the exclusive ability to recognize churches who will enjoy the ability to cooperate with the state. Recognition is dependent on conditions, but, according to the proposal, membership and historic traditions are not among these.

Constitutional Court decision 161/2011. (XII. 20.) destroyed the first church law due to its incompatibility with public law. The governing coalition then proceeded to record the very same concepts in the §21 of the Temporary Provisions. This was also voided by the Court. Consequently, the constitutional foundations of the effective church law became questionable. The Venice Commission found fault with the notion that the only body which can recognize organizations as churches is the National Assembly. With this configuration, there is no chance for legal remedy in case of an unfavorable parliamentary decision. The mechanisms used for determining recognition were also denounced.

To prevent further critiques, the governing parties recorded the cardinal structure for church laws in the Basic Law itself.

The Constitutional Court has already dealt with the complaints of the unfavored religious communities twice. A decision in the matter can be expected on February 11. Even if the Court will opine that the fundamental provisions of the church law are contrary to the Basic Law, the amendment would render this situation hopeless for smaller religious groups.

4. Media campaigns in public service media are included in the amendment using the wording featured in an unconstitutional (passed but not enacted) electoral legislation, while a cardinal law may limit electoral campaign in commercial media.

The amendment is an obvious response to the Constitutional Court’s 1/2013. (I. 7.) decision. This document declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral law accepted in the National Assembly on November 26, 2012. The Court found several faults with the legislation. Its resolution outlaws the controversial notion of preliminary voter registration. The justices called attention to the fact that the state exists to protect institutions, and as such it cannot plant unconstitutional hurdles in front of citizens to restrict their right to vote. Registries currently available to the state were deemed sufficient for the unhindered execution of the electoral process by both the Constitutional Court and the electoral law.

The Constitutional Court decided to abolish a ban on publishing or broadcasting political advertisements from electoral campaigns in media. The Court considered this ban a serious breach of the right to a political opinion during the course of an electoral campaign and considered it a grossly disproportionate measure. The 48 hour pre-election moratorium on political ads and a ban on political ads in movie theaters was also disfavored by the justices.

In response, the amendment implemented these changes on the constitutional level.

5. The amendment limits the right to free speech, as it does not allow free speech to violate the dignity of others.

It creates a basis for the new anti-hate speech rule in the Civil Code – which would have been unconstitutional. “The right to free speech cannot be utilized to demean the Hungarian nation and national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Members of such communities are entitled, as prescribed by law, to take their case to courts due to undignifying speech against the community.”

The Hungarian legislative owed a law on hate speech to the people. The left was unable to gain sufficient parliamentary support for its initiatives in the area.

At the same time, this document limits freedom of speech so severely that it is able to completely negate that right. In a state ruled by law, the only acceptable form of restriction targets communications which, in terms of consequences, pose a clear and direct threat to a social group. On the other hand, similarly to German dogmatics, the offended group has to be defined by a prominent feature of human personality and its size has to be sufficiently small. For this reason, war propaganda, hate-mongering against ethnic, racial, or religious groups, and declarations relating to the inferiority of any one group which contain discrimination, hostility, calls to or support for violence must be banned.

6. The financial independence of institutions of higher educations will be abolished. The amendment creates the foundations for obligating graduates to stay in the country.

According to regulations, the economic management of institutions of higher education are determined by the government through law. Management is then supervised by the executive. The law can mandate students to work domestically in certain fields for a predetermined amount of time.

In decision 32/2012. (VII. 4.), the Constitutional Court discontinued the practice of higher education contracts. The Court stated that the unconstitutionality lied in the fact that the executive was unable to regulate mandatory domestic employment for students at universities.

The day after the decision was made, the governing parties amended the law on higher education. Because the amendments were followed by wide-scale protests and civil disobedience among high school and university students, the government reacted by including the restriction in the Basic Law.

The amendment completely abolished the economic autonomy of institutions of higher learning. The state’s attitude towards higher learning focuses not on encouragement but punishment.

7. Local governments “strive” to provide the homeless with shelter. At the same time, the amendment allows for the lawful removal of the homeless from public spaces via policing tools. Local governments will be able to declare living in public spaces unlawful.

The events leading up to decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.) concerning the sanctioning of the homeless are the following.

Máté Kocsis (Fidesz), chair of the National Assembly’s Committee on Police and National Security and the mayor of Budapest’s District VIII initiated measures to combat homelessness with misdemeanor statues along with several other Fidesz representatives. According to their legislative proposal (also supported by Jobbik members), the “ban on living in public areas as a lifestyle” took effect on December 1, 2011. Its text states that “146/A § (1) Those who repeatedly violate the ban on living in public areas or who store their belongings in a manner suitable for such a lifestyle can be incarcerated or fined up to HUF 150,000. (2) The misdemeanor identified in paragraph (1) can only be considered as repeatedly occurring if the accused person has a conviction in a similar case in the last 6 month period. (3) The misdemeanor recorded in paragraph (1) belongs to the jurisdiction of the courts. (4) The sanctions determined in paragraph (1) cannot be applied if the city’s local governance does not implement care for the homeless.”

This was also recorded in a new misdemeanor legislation which took effect on April 15, 2012. The Constitutional Court’s decision destroyed this provision.

The Constitutional Court’s notable findings in the case:

The cause and the intended subject of legal protection by the legislator cannot be precisely identified in the debated notion of this misdemeanor.

• With this action, the legislator deemed living on the street – being homeless – illegal. For the homeless, their situation is a grave crisis which occurred due to several factors which are very rarely intentional. The homeless have lost their homes and have no opportunity to solve their habitation problems. As such, due to a lack of a real alternative, they must live in public areas.
•  The social law does not interpret living on the street as unlawful behavior. It records aiding those living in public areas as an issue which must be handled by local governments.
• The cause for the matter to be classified as a misdemeanor cannot be identified. On its own, the fact that someone lives in a public space does not violate the rights of others, cause damages, does not make using the public space dangerous, or does not endanger public order.
• According to the stance of the Constitutional Court, neither the removal of the homeless from public areas, nor the encouragement to make use of social services can be considered enough of a cause to declare homelessness as a misdemeanor.

The issue’s status as a misdemeanor does not clarify norms.

• With regards to the fact that the provision aims to punish not a behavior ( an act or a failure to act) but an objectively existing life situation in connection which guilt is not interpretable, it basically creates an objective responsibility which is separate from the subject.
• The inner area of public spaces is clearly defined, and it allows for the authorities’ arbitrary use of of legal interpretation.
• When a homeless person’s responsibility is waived is indeterminable, as this hinges on whether the local governance took the necessary steps.

8. The electoral rules and rights and the governments of nationalities are regulated by the Fourth Amendment in a manner based on the voided passages of the Temporary Provisions.

9. The amendment allows for the legal basis of the policing and disciplinary competencies of the Speaker of Parliament. It provides room for the Guard of the National Assembly in the Basic Law.

The law on the National Assembly provides the Speaker with considerable disciplinary and policing powers. When debating this issue and after the law actually took effect, it had to be pointed out that these measures significantly limit freedom of speech for the representatives of the National Assembly. At the same time, this is a highly ineffective tool and is not utilized against hate speech in Parliament.

The Speaker can exercise these new competencies through a parliamentary guard. This initiative is not directed at securing the National Assembly. It seems as if this is more a tool to silence political opposition. MSZP was forced to act against Speaker László Kövér’s biased behavior several times.

The constitutionally mandated creation of the Guard means that an organization with policing capabilities was created which owes no responsibility to the National Assembly.

10. The amendment alters the powers of the President of the Republic. The cause of this is the severe limitation of the Constitutional Court’s powers.

The President is only allowed to refer a Basic Law amendment to the Constitutional Court due to violations of procedural rules. The Basic Law’s contents cannot be revised by the Court. This provision is related to the restrictive changes made to the Constitutional Court’s powers.

11. Changes in the role of the Constitutional Court

The Fidesz-KDNP coalition’s alteration of the body’s function is not accidental. The Constitutional Court is the only checks and balances mechanism which can inhibit its legislative ambitions. When the Court struck down on several of the Temporary Provisions, it became obvious that in certain cases it can alter the contents of Basic Law amendments. As such, it was no longer only a body which could intervene when formal or procedural violations occurred. A scenario in which it could exercise these powers could occur if the Basic Law would be amended in a manner which contradicts its own contents. In addition to the above mentioned arguments, Istvan Stumpf’s following statement also refers to this concept.

Stumpf: “As long as a norm altering the Basic Law – through interpretation – can become part of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court cannot subject the contents its order for inclusion to a constitutional review. If such a tension cannot be resolved within the system provided by the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court must declare its unconstitutionality.

My perspective is that this could occur especially when the inclusion of a provision which was previously deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court would cause unresolvable tension within the Basic Law’s system. In these cases, the Constitutional Court already determined that the given provisions signify  violation of the Basic Law. Inclusion of these in the Basic Law could only satisfy the formal criteria for inclusion, but they would be unable to become integrated, coherent elements of the Basic Law. The unresolvable tension would not mandate a new examination into such a matter, because the Constitutional Court already subjected that to a constitutional review. In this regard the norm to be included was already declared to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and thus unchangeably contradicts the Basic Law.”

The implicit substantive requirements for the order for inclusion were not yet enforced by the Constitutional Court. The resolution, though it refers to the above mentioned items, does not subject those to constitutional review, because determining partial public law invalidity made this unnecessary. In this vein, our parallel analysis continues on the path of the Constitutional Court, but it also points beyond the Court’s findings, highlighting the possible courses of future events.

The following can be considered as troublesome limitations:

• It creates a deadline for the Constitutional Court for judicial reviews initiated by judges.
• The Court cannot examine or destroy legislation which is not in close connection with the provision mentioned in the referral (one of the failures of the electoral law was that the Constitutional Court extended one of its powers according to prior practice)
• The Constitutional Court can only review the Basic Law and its amendments in terms of formative and enactment-related procedural respects defined in the Basic Law. Preliminary review can be requested by the President of the Republic, while post-enactment review can be requested, in addition to current initiators, by the Chief Justice of the Kuria and the Chief Prosecutor.
• As prescribed by a cardinal law, the Constitutional Court can hold hearings for the person responsible for drafting the legislation and the legislation’s initiator or their agent. It can also attain their opinions if the matter affects a large number of people. This part of the procedure is public.

The amendment takes the destroyed limitations the Temporary Provisions placed on the Constitutional Court and places them into the Basic Law. According to this, as long as the national debt exceeds half of the gross domestic product, the Constitutional Court can only review laws (normally within its jurisdiction) on matters of the central budget, the state spending, central forms of taxation, benefits and aids, duties, and the central conditions for local taxation in terms of their Basic Law compatibility in connection with the right to life and human dignity, the freedom of religion, and rights  in connection with Hungarian citizenship. It can only void laws in these cases as well. According to the rule introduced by the amendment, this limitation on the Constitutional Court will remain in place for laws passed during this period even after the conditions existing under the current level of national debt are no longer present. In short, laws passed by the Fidesz-KDNP coalition can never be reviewed.

Constitutional Court decisions made before the acceptance of the Basic Law cannot be considered by the Court during the interpretation of the Basic Law.

This does not simply mean that the Court cannot rely on its previous findings. This can contain a notion that the body can distance itself from its previous decisions, e.g. the constitutional requirements for the rule of law. As an example, we can mention that the Court defined legal certainty as a necessary element of the rule of law. An imminent part of this is that prior to a law’s taking effect, a right cannot be revoked, a duty cannot be retroactively assigned, or it cannot make a previously mandated duty more severe. In this new interpretation, it is possible – in accordance with the governing parties’ previous practices – that retroactive legislation could be utilized in certain instances.

12.  The OBH chair’s election, which was regulated by a law previously, will now be included in the Basic Law.

13. The amendment records the OBH chair’s an the Chief Prosecutor’s right to assign cases to courts with other jurisdictions.

This is an element which plainly violates the right to a lawful judge. It was heavily criticized by the Venice Commission. The Constitutional Court previously eliminated these passages from the Temporary Provisions. The National Assembly altered the text of this document by stating that a cardinal law will determine the types of cases for which this right will apply; all in order to ensure the right to an expedient trial and to ease the case load for courts.

14. As long as the national debt is over half of the gross domestic product, if the Constitutional Court, the Court of the European Union, or other judicial or executive organization subjects the state to a payment obligation for which the funds in the central budget are insufficient, a contribution MUST be determined in a manner exclusively aimed at financing the common necessities of such an expense in name and content.

It is a distinct possibility in several instances, that Hungary will incur penalties or reimbursement obligations due to the decisions of the European Court. As for the Constitutional Court’s recent decisions in this field, we can highlight the unconstitutionality of the forced retirement of judges. According to the legislative proposal submitted by the government (the general debate of which is still ongoing in the Parliament), the retired judges are entitled to 12 months compensation if they do not request the restoration of their legal statuses. There are definitely no sums allocated for this in the budget. The source of funding for this then becomes questionable. It is entirely possible that this will be the first instance when they burden the population with the financial costs of enacting unconstitutional and illegal legislations.

The final provisions of the fourth Amendment adopt expired or already executed provisions without criticism. With its unacceptable legislative solutions, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition is already damaging the symbolic significance it established and nurtured by passing the Basic Law.