Billions diverted from Hungarian state coffers to natural gas broker

Thanks to Budapest Sentinel, we now have an English translation of an article published on the internet site 444.hu with the title “This is the way to make the most money in Hungary.” Earlier I wrote a post about MET Holding A.G., headquartered in Switzerland. It is partly owned by MOL, the Hungarian oil company, and partly by Hungarian individuals–people formerly employed by MOL and businessmen with close ties to Viktor Orbán. At the time there were a lot of questions about this very successful company, but since then 444.hu‘s journalists managed to ferret out details of MET’s business model. As a result of their work, we now know how the Orbán government manages to divert public money into private hands. We can be certain that this is not the only enterprise that specializes in creating a new business class on taxpayer money. Enjoy!

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President Vladimir Putin gives Prime Minister Viktor Orbán a knowing wink in January 2014

• MET has made huge profits on natural gas since 2011
• For this it needed the help of the government and state-owned MVM (Hungarian Electric Works)
• Russians are also involved
• Even as MET makes a lot of money, its business partner MVM requires state support

Over the past four years a Swiss-based company partially owned by various off-shore companies was given the opportunity by Hungary to enrich its owners in a totally unique fashion.

The Hungarian subsidiary of MET managed to make a huge amount of money by securing an exceptional place on the domestic gas market thanks to government orders and wonderful contracts.  After tax profits in 2012 alone were nearly HUF 50 billion (USD 225 million).

The government was so generous that all three opposition parties (MSZP, Jobbik, and LMP) filed complaints of misappropriation, fraud, and money laundering.   The National Office for Investigations, however, found no crime and did not open an investigation on the basis of any of the complaints.   Over a year ago MSZP, and now LMP, formally requested the MET gas contracts from MVM.  The parties are awaiting a court decision.

The machination that opened the road

It is not clear whether the elimination of the KÁT (obligatory electricity purchasing system) played a role in MET’s success, or whether one followed from the other, but the story starts here.

The KÁT was a unique kind of state support available in the case of renewable technologies or power plants producing both electricity and heat.  Here the second pillar of KÁT is interesting, which numerous local governments have to thank for being able to obtain heat inexpensively for district heating.   The theory was that the so-called “connected production” producing both electricity and heat was environmentally friendly because it made more efficient use of energy.  In this way the gas-fired power plants also qualified for state support and could supply heat cheaper.

The price of KÁT was built into the cost of electricity.  But in 2011 after a long debate the part pertaining to power producers was eliminated.  There was a big scandal about it.  For example, it was on this matter that former state secretary for energy matters János Bencsik clashed with then Fidesz caucus leader  János Lázár who submitted the bill.  Lázár won the battle and from July 2011 producers of electricity and heat no longer received supports from KÁT, and therefore could no longer provide a discount to many dozens of cities.

It was for this reason that the government issued a decree providing cheap gas to the settlements and institutions that suffered.  585 million cubic meters of gas was released from Hungary’s strategic gas reserve for this.  In this way it was possible to avoid increasing the price of district heating to many dozens of cities.  However, it was necessary to replenish the gas.

We’re replenishing, we’re replenishing

Let’s first look at the replenishment of the gas taken from the strategic reserve because that was the biggest business.

For many years it has been possible to purchase gas less expensively in Western Europe than the gas coming from Russia on the basis of the contract concluded (with Gazprom) in 1995.  (Of course, the gas coming from Western Europe may also have originated in Siberia, it is merely a matter of Russian pricing).

In the hope of obtaining cheaper western gas, the government issued a degree whereby the HAG pipeline between Hungary and Austria could be used free of charge in the interest of replenishing gas reserves.  Under normal circumstances gas traders would compete with one another for the right to use the pipeline, with the one paying the most given the right to use it.  This is a EU requirement, by the way.

However, given the extraordinary need to replenish gas, this obligation was temporarily suspended.   In the name of energy security the government made it possible to access the HAG pipeline without auction for one year between July 2011 and July 2012.  The government was very generous.  Minister for National Development Mrs. László Németh’s pencil cut a thick line.  In the interest of replenishing the 585 million cubic meters of gas used to compensate KÁT victims, it ordered that 2.9 billion cubic meters of gas could be transported without auction, in other words, very cheaply.

Furthermore, the law providing special access was extended from year to year, always with reference to energy security.  The current arrangement is valid through the end of June 2015.

For the past four years it has been possible to import a total of 19.6 billion cubic meters without having to compete for the right to use the pipeline.  All of this in order to replenish 585 million cubic meters of gas.  As the discounted quantity of gas completely used up the pipeline’s free capacity, during this time others could not access the HAG pipeline.  In other words, beyond the fact that the government put someone in a very favorable position, it also removed all competitors from the road.

According to the decree originally two companies were entitled to import gas without auction: the gas trading company (MVMP) owned by state-owned MVM (Hungarian Electric Works), and a small amount by E.on.  The gas business unit of the latter was acquired by the state in 2013 and given over to MVM.  In this manner, since then MVM has been the only beneficiary of this arrangement.

Apart from the long-term contract concluded with the Russians, only the state could import gas cheaper.  However, somebody else also made money off of this.  To be more precise, somebody else primarily made money off of this.

How does MET come into the picture?

Profits arising from the sale of gas imported inexpensively by MVMP could have enriched its owner, the state.  Or it could have sold the gas cheaper to consumers, and in this way help decrease utility costs.  But it did neither.  The arising profits were collected by the Hungarian subsidiary of Swiss based MET Holding.

The model works as follows:

• One of MET’s subsidiaries, METI, bought cheap gas from the west
• It sold the gas at the Austrian-Hungarian border to MVMP
• MVMP imported the gas by availing itself of free access to the pipeline in accordance with the decree on energy security, extended annually
• On the same day MVMP sold the gas at minimal profit to MET
• MET was than free to sell the gas to Hungary for whatever it could

So in practice the state allowed a market player to use the pipeline.  This is indicated by the fact that, according to the contracts, only such cash traded hands as was necessary for MET to pay MVMP a small margin for transporting the gas over the border.   This was HUF 2.50 (USD 0.012) per cubic meter.  Gas purchased from MET was HUF 32 (USD 0.15) cheaper per cubic meter in 2012 than the gas arriving from Russia on the basis of the long-term contract.

A year ago, an unknown individual posted part of the contracts concluded between MVM and MET online, without which no one would have found out what is happening.

And what became of the gas taken from the storage tanks?

The whole matter started when the government released 585 million cubic meters of gas from strategic storage in order to help those for whom district heating became more expensive as a result of the decrease in KÁT. Except part of the gas went to MET.

The official reason for this was that no one else needed the cheap gas.  According to the explanation, by the time the government decree was issued obliging MVM to release the cheap gas, every district heating company and potential beneficiary had already contracted with the market for the gas quantity required for the year.  MVM then decided that if it could not sell directly to those consumers leaving it in the lurch, it would issue a tender to sell the cheap gas.

In September 2013 and February 2014 Hungarian Socialist Party MPs Tibor Kovács and István Józsa posed questions relating to Mrs. László Németh, then Minister for National Development.  From her answers it is possible to figure out what happened.

From the answer given by Mrs. Németh in September, it can be determined that of the 585 million cubic meters of gas, only 270.6 million cubic meters could be supplied indirectly to the beneficiaries.  In other words, half the gas inventory was given over to traders.

And from the answer she gave in February 2014, it turned out that the trader was MET.

All of this the government found to be appropriate considering that by ministerial decree MVMP had to take delivery of the reserve gas.  And if it did not find a customer it was only logical that it sell the remaining gas through public tender with the requirement that the trader sell the gas to the KÁT victims.

Too much money, too little money

In 2012 it was readily apparent who was making money on this.  Even as the gas trading unit of MVM closed the year with a loss of half a billion forints (USD 2.3 million),  MET’s owners were able to take HUF 55 billion (USD 205 million) worth of dividends out of the company.

For a long time MVM was one of the largest revenue generators for the state.  Furthermore, it always had a lot of cash on hand.  It was precisely for this reason that from the first decade of this century it routinely happened that if there was a problem, MVM helped with the budget.   The trick was frequently employed by which the state took a few billions out of MVM if it got into temporary trouble.

Next to the state’s loss, MVM’s losses were negligible.  But one of Mol’s subsidiaries, FGSZ also lost on this construction because for years it could not issue a tender to use the HAG pipeline.  Fortunately, Mol was the 40 percent owner of MET.  (Mol stands for Hungarian Oil Company. -ed.)

But who are the owners?

This is not possible to know with certainty.   Even MET Hungary Zrt. CEO Gergely Szabó wasn’t willing to reveal this information to Figyelő.

What is certain is that MET Holding AG was registered in Switzerland, which has numerous subsidiaries. 40 percent of the holding company is owned by Mol, 10 percent by a Swiss company by the name of MET ManCo AG, in which Benjámin Lakatos has an interest.  The 38 year-old Lakatos, who is also the director of MET Holding, previously worked for Mol and is considered to be a confident of Mol CEO Zsolt Hernádi.

50 percent of the company belongs to WISD Holding, which owns numerous miscellaneous companies via a complicated network of offshore companies.  (Hungarian investigative website) Átlátszó previously unearthed that, among the companies in which WISD has an ownership interest, are companies owned by István Garancsi and György Nagy.  Garancsi is the owner of the Videoton football team and a good friend of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Zsolt Hernádi.

In the domestic business world György Nagy is considered an ally of OTP president Sándor Csányi.   Garancsi and Nagy are owners of WISD through their respective Cypriot companies, Inather Ltd. and Westbay.

The third known owner of WISD is Small Valley Investments Ltd., which is registered in the British Virgin Islands.  According to our information the company is owned by Russians, and that altogether they own 20 percent of MET Holding.

The fourth owner of WISD is a Swiss company by the name of Deneb Algedi Invest AG which is also owned by Benjámin Lakatos.

Viktor Orbán comes up

In Autumn of this year a Swiss and a Roman paper published articles claiming that the reason Viktor Orbán traveled to Switzerland may have been to conduct MET business.  A number of Hungarian energy experts are of the opinion that the articles appearing in the foreign papers were a warning on the part of foreign secret services that they were watching the opaque energy deals of the Hungarian government with Russia.  The articles appeared in two relatively minor international papers that are not in the habit of breaking stories of world economic importance.

Even before the Swiss article appeared, there were a lot of rumors that MET was very important to the Prime Minister.  The theory was that the company is an important part of the new economic elite being organized around the Hungarian head of government.

The Russians were also needed

In 2007 Mol founded the company that grew into MET Holding, and which the oil company was the only owner at the beginning.  In 2004 Mol sold its gas unit, but with the establishment of MET retained the possibility of returning one day to the gas trade.

In 2009 a company registered in Belize (Normeston) bought half of MET, at which point the Russians acquired an interest.  Belize is a Central American company where the institution of “introduction shares” exists.  This means that those people receive the dividends who can personally show that the shares are physically with them.  It is not necessary for them to introduce themselves.  That Russians were behind the company was confirmed by Gergely Szabó, MET Hungary CEO to Figyelő.   The company needed the Russians in order to help obtain gas cheaply:  “We also hoped that through its owners MET could obtain gas advantageously”.   That Russians are involved in the company through Small Valley, I heard from person familiar with Mol matters.

As Szabó explained, the Russians can obtain gas inexpensively.  There are those who believe that they are the other leg to MET’s wonderful rise.

Anyway the Russians are willing to sell gas to a given country cheaper than what is provided by the official, long-term contract, and creates various trading companies for the purpose of conducting the business.

This is how the business works

The trade in gas is the most profitable business on this side of Europe because:

• Huge quantities of it are needed, and it is possible to sell it in huge amounts.  Even with small margins it is possible to make huge profits in a short period of time.
• Because it arrives through pipelines, it is easy to establish a monopoly situation with it: only those with access to the pipeline can also sell it.
• The market is influenced by state regulations.  Who obtains the favors of the authorities needn’t be afraid of competitors.
• It is almost impossible to obtain gas that is not Russia.  Whoever is on good terms with them shall be showered in gold.

In these parts nearly all the gas comes from Russia, where the state has a monopoly and where the huge company by the name of Gazprom is responsible for production, delivery, as well as trade.  The Russians like to agree on gas prices separately with countries in this region for long periods, whenever possible.  The last of the so-called long-term contracts concluded by Hungary in 1995 for twenty years expires this summer.  There is no agreement regarding its extension and for this reason there is a lot of movement in the Hungarian gas market these days.

The long-term contracts are always political decisions often determined over the course of negotiations between the Kremlin and the government of the other country.  Gazprom sells the same gas at prices that vary by as much as three-fold.  There were times when Gazprom sold gas to Bulgaria for USD 600 per cubic meter but only charged Belarusian USD 167. There really is not other product on the international market for which there really is no price.  Nobody knows how much it costs to produce gas in Russia, and the Russians sell to their customers based on whatever momentary political interests dictate.

The buyers have little choice in the matter.  For example, in Hungary most households heat with gas, and much of the electricity is produced from gas, which is indispensable for industry.  So gas is required.  And it is difficult to choose among suppliers.   Oil prices exist because it is possible to change sources of supply:  oil comes in a barrel and in containers from just about anywhere.  For this reason oil prices are, for the most part, uniform.  A seller cannot allow himself to play with prices.  However, this is not the case with the delivery of gas, which is tied to pipelines.

There is also a cheaper one

So the gas enters the country on the basis of a price structure contained in the 1995 agreement.  But if the Russians want, they supply the same gas for less.

The Russians anyway created a shadow model as well.  In certain cases, seemingly harmful to their own market, they also sell gas cheaply to certain beneficiaries.  The way the model works is that they set up a trading company that is allowed to purchase gas from Gazprom at a reduced price, and then sell it to the target market for less than what is provided for by the long-term contract, but still with a respectable profit.

The Russians operate such brokerage companies for two reasons: on the one hand it enables them to sideline those among their own people the Kremlin happens to target.

On the other hand, it enables them to create and control the oligarchs and politicians of the target country.  Operating such a brokerage company is not only a good investment from the point of view of bribing oligarchs in the target country.  In general, through these companies it is also able to blackmail the target country even if its partners lose their influence as a result of a domestic political change or domestic showdown.   If a country becomes addicted to cheap gas, then whoever is in power thinks twice before deciding whether to terminate the grey business with the Russians at the price of higher utility costs, or for the new people to take the warm seats of the oligarchs of the previous cycle.

In this manner it is possible to earn a lot of money without effectively doing any work.  The brokerage companies sell the same thing as their competitors from the same sources.  They simply are able to access it less expensively.  Apart from paper work there is no other task.

There is some indication that MET partially works on the basis of this model.  There is no proof of this, but various domestic energy industry experts believe it is likely that the company can purchase Russian gas in Western European less expensively thanks to its Russian owners.

How does a more sophisticated model work?

The largest of such brokerage companies to ever exist was the Russian-Ukrainian RosUkrEnergo, which during its heyday in 2006 was able to make USD 785 million in profits in just under one year (this is about one half of the profits Austria’s ÖMV made in 2013).  Apart from this, neither refineries, nor petrol stations, nor anything else had to be maintained.  All that was required was the work of some lawyers in Switzerland.   RosUkrEnergo bought gas at a discount on the Russian side of the Russian-Ukrainian border, and then sold it on the other side.  Naturally, nothing happened to the gas itself.  The transaction only took place on paper.  Half of the company belonged to Ukraine Oligarch Dmitrij Firtas, the other half belonged to a Swiss subsidiary of Gazprom.

Reuters estimates that Gazprom lost USD 2 billion in under a few years by selling gas cheap to Firtas.  Except Firta was one of the most influential people in Ukraine for a long time.  More than half of the members of parliament literally took instructions for him, and in this way it was possible to manipulate Ukrainian politics to suit Russia’s needs.

For a while in 2009 Firtas was taken out of the business when Yulia Timoshenko became the Ukranian prime minister.  Then they took him back.  And then after (former Ukrainian president) Jankovics’ failure, he once again fell out of the picture.  He is presently under house arrest in Vienna, and most recently called attention to himself by announcing that Hungarian and Romanian paid assassins were threatening his life

However, the Hungarian connection does not only appear with Firtas.  He was the owner of a former Hungarian company by the name of Emfesz which, in its heyday, supplied Hungary with one-quarter of its gas, and which operated according to the same model: it gained a market for itself in Hungary with cheap gas from RosUkrEnergo.   In only a few years, Emfesz became the 27^th largest company in Hungary out of nothing.  This also shows the huge amount of easy money can be found in this business model.

Is MET the new Emfesz?

With the failure of Emfesz Hungary’s shadow model domestic player died out.  But it appears that a new company, MET, was able to step into its place, but just a little differently.   The Russians appeared as owners of MET in 2009.  That was the year when Firtas was pushed out of the gas trade, and with this Emfesz’ fate was sealed.

MET happened to become the large winner of the KÁT gas compensation in spring 2011 when Hungary and Russia opened a new chapter in relation to energy.  At that time the Hungarian government purchased a 21.4 percent interest in Mol from Russia’s Surgutneftegaz.  It is not possible to know who the owners of Surgutneftegaz are, but it is for certain that we are talking about companies that are close to the Kremlin.   This company, for example, supplies petrol to the Russian military.

At the time the purchase of the shares in Mol appeared to be a victory: using state administrative means the Russians were prevented from having a say in the running of MOL, and the government considered the business to be a national security success.  They claimed to have arranged for us not to be at the mercy of the Russians.  However, in retrospect it appears that the business may have been the start of a new Russian-Hungarian energy cooperation involving the political leadership of the two countries.   This is indicated by the fact that until that time Fidesz regarded Russia with suspicion.  However, since 2011 the friendship between the two governments has strengthened, and they are more and more cooperation agreements to show for it.

MET is expanding

These days MET is visibly strengthening, and it is readily apparent that the company’s ambition goes beyond simply bringing gas to Hungary.  Last year it purchased the Dunamenti Power station which produces electricity from gas and which is the country’s second largest producer of electricity.  The power plant almost went bankrupt before MET acquired it.  MET was able to save the power station by acquiring gas less expensively than the French.

In the same way, MET acquired GDP Suez Energy Holding Hungary Zrt. last year, which was the domestic electricity trader for the French company.

Offshore is not a problem

The Hungarian government officially opposes the spread of offshore companies to Hungary.  The new Fundamental Law officially opposes the spread of offshore companies in Hungary.  According to the new Fundamental Law the government of Hungary may not conduct business with companies whose ownership structure is not transparent.   Among MET’s owners are numerous offshore companies which, with powerful help from the state, are able to find fantastic opportunities in Hungary.

 

Mysterious trips of Viktor Orbán and János Lázár to Switzerland

Today I will have to pull up my socks if I want to give even a semi-coherent summary of the growing scandal surrounding a company called MET Holding A.G. with headquarters in Switzerland. The holding company, established only a couple of years ago, is partially owned by MOL (40%) and partially by Hungarian individuals–people formerly employed by MOL and businessmen with close ties to Viktor Orbán.

First of all, it’s hard to decipher the company’s structure which is, as is often the case with enterprises like MET Holding, extremely complicated. Second, since it is likely that MET Holding, in addition to its regular activities, also serves as a money laundering operation for Fidesz as well as Viktor Orbán and his friends, those involved do everything in their power to conceal the company’s business activities, ownership, financials, and so on.

I should go back a few years to February 2010, only a month before the national election and the birth of the two-thirds majority, when the U.S. Embassy in Budapest compiled a report entitled “Allegations of political corruption surround unbundling law.” From the lengthy report we learn that “it is an open secret in Hungary that MVM and MOL provide significant funding to the two main political parties, with MVM rumored to favor the Socialists and MOL favoring Fidesz.”

MET Group predated this U.S. report. According to its promotional material, it began operating in 2007 “in the natural gas retail and wholesale sector benefiting from the market liberalization starting in 2004.” Currently it is active in wholesale gas trading in the European market as well as in the retail sale of natural gas to industrial customers in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Croatia. Five years later, in 2012 MET Holding was established with the objective of being “a central holding organization to manage and support all the subsidiaries of MET Group.” (If you want to know why MET Holding might have been layered on top of MET Group, I suggest you take a look at “How a Holding Company Works.”)

Shortly after the election in 2010 Orbán promised cheaper energy to consumers. In order to lower prices the state-owned MVM (Magyar Villamossági Művek) was allowed to dip into its gas reserves which it could then replenish with cheaper gas from the open market. MVM could have bought the necessary gas directly from Austria, but instead it purchased gas through MET. According to the figures that are available about the transaction, MVM gained little while MET made about 50 billion forints on the deal.

The owners of MET, in addition to MOL, are István Garancsi, a personal friend of Viktor Orbán and owner of Orbán’s favorite football team, Videoton, and György Nagy, one of the founders of Wallis Asset Management Co., a private equity/venture capital firm. Both men have close ties to Zsolt Hernádi, the beleagured CEO of MOL who is accused of bribery in Croatia, and to Sándor Csányi, his deputy and the CEO of OTP, Hungary’s largest bank. Heading MET Holding is Benjamin Lakatos. He expects sales this year to total some 3.8 billion euros.

Most likely nobody would have cared about this Hungarian company with headquarters in Zug, Switzerland, if Hungary’s prime minister hadn’t been so involved in negotiations with Putin as well as with Russian energy companies, in particular Gazprom and Rossatom, the Russian company that specializes in building nuclear power plants. Rossatom was chosen to construct two extra reactors at the Paks power plant. Given the widespread concern over Viktor Orbán’s dealings with the Russian autocrat, Swiss journalists started probing into this mysterious MET. A  well researched article appeared on November 3 in TagesAnzeiger, which was later reprinted in Basler Zeitung. According to the Swiss paper, MET Power, MET Marketing, MET International, and MET Holding all share the same Zug address. Benjamin Lakatos is the CEO of all of them. Zug, by the way, is about 20 km south of Zurich.

I understand that the company’s management is made up of former MOL employees who know the energy business inside out but who found greater opportunities outside of MOL. Lakatos is very proud of his achievement of building MET Holding in two years from practically nothing to a sizable player in the energy business, though one cannot help but be suspicious of a such a sudden rise in fortune. Moreover, given the cozy relationship in the past between MOL and Fidesz, one wonders what role MET may play in the possibly continued reliance of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán on MOL as a source of illicit money. With István Garancsi’s name in the cast of characters, one becomes doubly suspicious since he is often portrayed in the Hungarian press as Orbán’s front man.

Source: http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch

And now let’s move to more recent events that might have something to do with MET Holding. I’m patching the story together from several sources. You may recall that the editor-in-chief of Origo, an online news portal, was dismissed because one of the reporters of the internet site was too curious about a couple of very expensive trips János Lázár, the most important member of the Orbán government after the prime minister, made to Great Britain and Switzerland. Lázár for a long time resisted revealing any details of these trips but eventually after a court order the prime minister’s office released some information. Among the bits and pieces of information that Origo received, there was one item that might be relevant. Origo was informed that János Lázár during his Swiss trip “held conversations with a German citizen about German-Hungarian and Russian-Hungarian relations.”

More than a year later there was another trip to Switzerland. This time it was a private affair. Viktor Orbán and his wife and János Lázár and his wife spent a weekend in Zurich. First they stopped in Germany to visit a “family friend” and then off they went to Zurich, allegedly to attend a concert given by a children’s choir from the Szekler areas of Romania. Quite a lame excuse for traveling to Zurich because earlier this same group gave three concerts in the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest. There was also a side trip to visit a friend in Germany. Is he perhaps the same man Lázár held talks with in March 2012?

About a week ago Viktor Orbán made another trip to Switzerland. This time the occasion was a family visit (including his wife and their two youngest daughters) with Rachel, who is enrolled in a fancy, expensive hotel management course in Lausanne. Since, again, this was a private visit, the prime minister’s office refused to release any information about the trip. However, thanks to an eagle-eyed person, Orbán was spotted at the  Zurich railroad station having a beer with an unidentified man. Since the Orbáns decided to travel back to Hungary by train, a stopover in Zurich was unavoidable since there is no direct train from Geneva, a forty-minute train ride from Lausanne. But why did he choose to go by train from Lausanne all the way to Budapest, a trip that takes altogether 16 hours and 22 minutes? He said that wanted to spend more time with his children. Well, I could imagine many more pleasant ways of spending time with my family than sitting in a second-class train compartment. Suspicious Hungarians already have their own theory: for one reason or other, Orbán chose to travel by train because there is no inspection of either persons or luggage on trains. I find that difficult to believe. I hope that we are not at a point that the country’s prime minister is carrying millions of euros in his suitcase.

Although one can probably discard such speculation, one should take more seriously the information received by the Demokratikus Koalíció that while in Zurich Orbán met representatives of Credit Suisse and Pictet Bank. Pictet is a private bank which in 2012 was the target of a U.S. probe into the use of foreign banks by wealthy Americans seeking to avoid paying taxes. Pictet specializes in “wealth management.” As for Credit Suisse, which is one of the most powerful banks in the world, it also had its problems with the law. In July 2014 Credit Suisse reported a loss of $779 million because of the settlement of a tax evasion case in the United States. Zsolt Gréczy, the spokesman for DK, emphasized that they are not accusing Orbán of anything; they simply want to know whether he met with representatives of these two banks as the prime minister of Hungary or as a private individual.

All in all, the picture that emerges from the few pieces of information we have is not pretty. Orbán has enough trouble as it is. Tonight another 10,000 people demanded Ildikó Vida’s resignation–and his as well.

International pressure on Viktor Orbán: Russia, Putin, and Gazprom

There is real concern among former Hungarian diplomats and foreign policy experts that Hungary’s isolation is practically complete and that she may remain the only “strategic ally,” to use Viktor Orbán’s favorite term even in connection with China, of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And if the Orbán government does not try to extricate itself from this situation, the consequences can be serious. Although Fidesz supporters are convinced that the United States has embarked on the destabilization of the country with the goal of removing Viktor Orbán from power, this cannot be Washington’s intent. After all, the opposition is in disarray and replacing Orbán with another Fidesz politician would not accomplish anything. A new prime minister would be merely a figurehead; the real power would remain in the hands of Viktor Orbán.

Admittedly, on the surface this conspiracy theory finds some support in the coincidence of the American move to ban six corrupt officials and businessmen from the United States and the massive demonstrations against the internet tax that soon enough became a protest movement against the whole regime. But the latter wasn’t the U.S.’s doing. It was the folly of the Hungarian government that seems to commit more and more mistakes lately. Did Viktor Orbán lose his magic touch, or has he navigated himself into an impossible situation in which the “peacock dance” is no longer possible? He is increasingly being faced with a stark choice: either total commitment to the side of Russia or capitulation and acceptance of the rules of the game within NATO and the European Union.

Orbán might be a good politician–if we define a good politician as someone who can play one person against another, who can fool his allies, who disregards the law, and who within a few years manages to institute a one-party system, because that is what we have in Hungary. But his track record shows that he cannot govern, that he cannot run a country successfully. We who watched his first four years between 1998 and 2002 with growing concern knew that already, but it seems that in the eight years that followed his disastrous rule the Hungarian people forgot why they went out in record numbers to make sure that this man and his regime don’t come back.

The situation today is ten times worse than it was during his first administration. He has transformed the country into an illiberal democracy, and his pro-Russian policies have alienated Hungary’s allies. Viktor Orbán is considered to be a pariah and someone who is toxic because of his potential influence on some of the other countries in the region. Western politicians look upon him as a fellow traveler of Vladimir Putin. And, indeed, they seem to borrow each other’s ideas. Orbán copies Putin’s attacks on NGOs, while, it seems, Putin was inspired by Orbán’s nationalization of the textbook industry, reported just yesterday in the western press.

During his first administration Orbán was fiercely anti-Russian, and it seems that he didn’t change his mind on that score until lately. In December 2009 a Hungarian foreign policy expert and obvious admirer of Orbán described the forthcoming Fidesz victory as “Moscow’s nightmare.” Early in his second administration he worked furiously on a quasi-alliance system from the Baltic to the Adriatic in which Hungary would have a leading position. But his fellow prime ministers in the region wanted nothing to do with Orbán’s grandiose plan. He made every effort to dislodge Surgut, a Russian company that had a 21.2% stake in MOL, the Hungarian oil and gas company. By May 2011, after lengthy negotiations, the Hungarian government bought out Surgut, paying a very high price. At that time Hungary was no friend of Russia. Not yet. However, according to Fidesz sources, Orbán decided to radically change course sometime in early 2013.  He spent about six months pondering the issue and came to the conclusion sometime during the summer of 2013 that he would turn to Russia for an expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. According to the same sources, his decision was based on his belief that the Czech Republic and Germany would need cheap energy which Hungary would be able to provide.

Since then, with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the political climate in Europe has changed dramatically. Orbán’s flirtation with Russia is looked upon with more than suspicion. The West considers Viktor Orbán and Hungary a liability. Soon enough, I believe, he will have to show his true colors. No more peacock dance. But it seems that Orbán by now is embroiled in all sorts of machinations with Russia in general and Gazprom in particular. The current setting for Hungarian machinations with Gazprom is Croatia.

Just a few words by way of background. In 2008-2009 MOL acquired a 47.47% stake in INA, the Croatian oil and gas company. In 2011 a Croatian newspaper reported that Zsolt Hernádi, CEO of MOL, had been accused by the Croatian prosecutor’s office of bribery. Naturally, the Hungarian prosecutor’s office found nothing wrong, but the Croats eventually went so far as to hand the case over to Interpol. As a result, Hernádi couldn’t leave the country; otherwise he would have been subject to immediate arrest. More details can be found in a post I wrote on the subject in October 2013. The decision was eventually made to get rid of MOL’s share in INA, but the Croatian government does not have the kind of money needed to buy MOL’s stake. Lately, there has been talk in the Hungarian press that MOL will sell its shares to a Russian buyer, most likely Gazprom itself. So, Gazprom will not only store gas in Hungary but might even control almost half of INA in Croatia.

INA: Managed by MOL

And now let’s return to American-Hungarian relations. According to some observers, “the highly unusual step of blacklisting six people with ties to the government in Hungary, a NATO ally and European Union member,” also has something to do with the “growing closeness between Hungary and the Kremlin over energy that could undermine Western attempts to isolate Russian leader Vladimir Putin over his intervention in Ukraine.” So far there is not much new in that assertion, published in an article by Reuters. We have known all along that, in addition to Orbán’s domestic policies, his relations with Russia were a serious concern to the United States and the European Union. What is new in this revelation is that Washington is apparently keeping an eye on the possible MOL-INA deal with Gazprom. According to the article, Chris Murphy, U.S. senator from Connecticut, was dispatched to Zagreb “to lobby the government … on the issue.” Another interesting piece of information gleaned from the article is that State Department official Amos J. Hochstein, Acting Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, met Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and had a “productive meeting during Szijjártó’s recent visit to Washington about MOL’s stake, the South Stream, and Hungarian gas deliveries to Ukraine.”

All in all, it seems to me that Viktor Orbán is in over his head, especially with a foreign minister with no diplomatic experience. Szijjártó was an excellent spokesman for Viktor Orbán as the head of the “parrot commando,” but he is not qualified to be foreign minister, especially at such a delicate juncture.

It is hard to tell what Orbán’s next step will be. Fidesz media attacks on the United States are fiercer than ever, and its admiration of Russia is frightening. But more about that tomorrow.

Scandal surrounding the purchase of E.ON gas company

The left-of-center Hungarian media is full of stories about details of  the purchase of the German-owned E.ON gas and electricity company by MVM (Magyar Villamos Művek), a state-owned utility company.

Let’s go back a few years to recall the background of this deal. Rumors of the purchase of the company were already circulating in the summer of 2011 because Viktor Orbán made it clear that he found state ownership of utilities of strategic importance to the country. Not everybody shared the Hungarian prime minister’s view. For example, the Financial Times Deutschland at the time called the idea “madness,” arguing that the price of energy cannot be lowered by nationalizing the utility companies.

It is also important to understand the history of E.ON in Hungary. Originally E.ON bought the company from MOL, the Hungarian oil and gas company, when during the initial tenure of Viktor Orbán (1998-2002) the government set the price of gas so low that MOL suffered considerable losses. For ten years E.ON managed to make the Hungarian business profitable, but in 2010 it suffered a blow when the second Orbán government once again froze the price of gas. As a result, E.ON lost money. The Germans decided to bail and sell the company to the Hungarian state. The deal was closed in March 2013. At the time experts found the purchase price too high.

Because of the controversy over the purchase price, atlatszo.hu  (Transparency), an NGO that receives some funds from the Norwegian Grants, decided to ask for documentation about the deal. Although by law the Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő/Hungarian National Asset Management, the state organization that handles state properties, was obliged to release the documents, they refused. At that point atlatszo.hu went to court and won. The state appealed but atlatszo.hu won again. That did not deter MNV. They decided to go all the way to the Supreme Court (Kúria). But no luck. After a year and a half of legal wrangling the Hungarian state was forced to release the documents. Atlatszo.hu promptly made them public on its website.

On the basis of the documents now released, it looks as if MVM purchased a company that was practically bankrupt. The purchase price of 251 billion forints was considered too high when critics were unaware of the actual financial health of E.ON. As it turned out, the assessors estimated the value of E.ON to be -355 billion forints. Yes, you read it right: minus. So, with the 251 billion paid by the government, the loss to the country is 616 billion forints.

Viktor Orbán was bent on purchasing E.ON regardless of price. In fact, even before negotiations began he repeatedly announced his absolute determination to acquire the company. Not the smartest move. There was not much haggling over price either. The Germans asked 260 billion forints and, it seems, Orbán was happy to pay.

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Chairman-CEO of E.ON

In fact, he was so eager that he wasn’t bothered by the fact that the Hungarians were unable to examine the financial health of the company thoroughly. The German side announced that certain documents would be released only after the deal was complete.

The negotiators from MNV were aware of the riskiness of the transaction and were afraid to go ahead with the deal without appealing to a higher authority. They wanted to submit their findings to the Ministry of National Development for approval. Mrs. László Németh, then minister of MND, did not feel comfortable with the deal either, so in the end it was Viktor Orbán who personally assured MNV of state guarantees for any losses incurred as a result of the transaction.

Apparently the greatest risk for the health of the company is the “take-or-pay contract” that has existed for many years between Gazprom and the E.ON companies. That means that the company either takes the product from the supplier or pays the supplier a penalty. After 2008, in the wake of the global financial crisis, Hungary’s gas needs decreased considerably. And yet the company was obliged to buy gas regardless of need. Some references in the documentation indicate that after the close of the deal the new owners might be able to negotiate with Gazprom concerning the take-or-pay arrangement. Orbán’s cozy relationship with Putin should help in this regard.

Critics also point to legal irregularities. For instance, owners of E.ON shares were not notified thirty days before the deal was signed. There is also the possibility that Brussels will consider the state subsidies to MVM illegal. (Apparently, the socialists already asked the European Union to investigate the case.)

The new division of MVM cannot stand on its own financially. Not only does it need state subsidies to cover its costs, but two of the gas storage facilities bought from E.ON already had to be closed.

Együtt-PM and DK are bringing charges of mismanagement and abuse of fiduciary duties in connection with the purchase of the E.ON gas business by MVM. MSZP was more modest. The party only asked Miklós Seszták, the new minister of national development, to investigate the case. If I were the representative of MSZP I wouldn’t wait breathlessly for this investigation. The ministry already made its position clear tonight. Hungary cannot be at the mercy of foreign interests in the energy sector, and therefore the purchase of E.ON was necessary for the “defense of the decrease of utility prices.” Getting back the gas company is also of inestimable value from the point of view of national security because of the gas facilities where Hungary can store 70% of its yearly gas consumption.

As for the purchase itself. “Several independent assessments showed the economic justifiability of the purchase in the long run.  The state ownership guarantees the secure gas supply of Hungary and it serves as a solid foundation for future economic growth,” reads the statement of the ministry released to MTI. I must say that this is a pretty weak response to the very serious charge of financial irresponsibility with taxpayer money.

In the right-wing media the silence is deafening. The only article I found was in MNO (Magyar Nemzet Online). It was posted at 17:33 and is a bare outline of how the documents were acquired by atlatszo.hu and what the documents show. It seems that, since the Ministry of National Development hadn’t yet responded to the revelations, the paper’s editors didn’t know what the right position was on this particular issue. I guess they will eventually find their voices.

As for the Fidesz-friendly prosecutors, they were quick to charge socialist and liberal politicians with an abuse of fiduciary duty for selling state properties at prices they considered too low. But it is unlikely they will ever charge Fidesz politicians with the same abuse for buying state properties at prices that are too high.

Hungarian thread in the Polish scandal

This time we will make a trip to Poland, a country that in the last two weeks has been in political turmoil. It all began with some tapes released by Wprost, a news magazine, on which Marek Belka, governor of the Polish national bank, and Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, minister of the interior, have a conversation in June 2013. During the conversation, one can hear Sienkiewicz asking Belka whether the central bank would help the government by cutting interest rates if Poland faced an economic meltdown before the elections this year. It appears that Belka says that “his condition would be the removal of the finance minister, Jacek Rostowki.” Rostowski was indeed removed in November 2013, but the national bank did not lower interest rates. Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the leader of the opposition Law and Justice party, said he would call for a no-confidence vote.

But what does all this have to do with Hungary? Well, as it turned out, Wprost had other tapes in its possession in which Polish politicians can be heard talking about international affairs. They certainly don’t mince words when talking about the United States, David Cameron, or, as it turned out, Viktor Orbán. The discussion is studded with such expletives and sexually explicit language that when I wanted to read the details of these conversations in Index, I was confronted with a page on which I had to attest that I was over eighteen. That will give you an idea.

But let’s first introduce you to the cast of characters. First and foremost, there is Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, who just threw his hat in the ring to replace Lady Catherine Ashton as high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy and vice-president of the European Commission. On the released tape Sikorski has a conversation with Jacek Rostowski, the man who lost his job as finance minister last November. I have the feeling that after these revelations, Sikorski can forget about any position in Brussels. I even doubt that he will remain foreign minister of Poland for long.

Perhaps the  most damaging part of Sikorski’s remarks is what he had to say about U.S.-Polish relations, especially after Barack Obama’s visit to Poland and his promise of a billion dollars to beef up defenses in central and eastern Europe. Sikorski asserted that “the Polish-American alliance is worthless, even harmful, as it gives Poland a false sense of security. It’s bullsh..t.” Sikorski on the same tape allegedly said that the Polish people have the mentality of “murzyńkosć,” a derogatory and racially-loaded term meaning roughly “like a Negro.” “The problem in Poland is that we have very shallow pride and low self-esteem,” he added.

It turned out today when the whole tape was released by Wprost that Sikorski also has a very low opinion of David Cameron. The embarrassing details were  immediately reported by the British media. To get the full flavor of the conversation one should read an article published a few hours ago by The Guardian.

These are  juicy stories that are spreading rapidly in the international press. But other tapes were also released, one of which is about Hungary. Russian-Hungarian relations and the legal difficulties of Zsolt Hernádi, CEO of MOL, the Hungarian oil and gas company, were discussed by Dariusz Jacek Krawieć, CEO of PKN Orlen S.A., the Polish refinery, and Włodzimierz Karpiński, current minister of finance. It is that conversation that Index refuses to allow people under the age of eighteen to read. The upshot of it is that Orbán made a very bad deal and that Hungary by this loan agreement became a “vassal” of Russia.

And now on to Zsolt Hernádi, who is being accused in Croatia of paying €5 million to Ivo Sanader in exchange for a 48% stake in INA, the Croatian refinery company owned by the Croatian state. Soon enough formal charges were leveled against Hernádi and an international warrant was issued for his arrest. Hernádi was stuck in Hungary. Otherwise Interpol would have arrested him. It also seems that a former employee and a small investor in MOL sued Hernádi for damages she allegedly suffered as a result of the bribery charges leveled against Hernádi. In the first round, not terribly surprisingly, the court decided in his favor.

Zsolt Hernádi, a close ally and friend of Viktor Orbán / Source; maszol.ro

Jacek Krawiec adds spice to this story. Let me quote:

Listen, I’ll tell you a case which shows how different our situation is from that of the Hungarians. I visited Hernádi because he cannot leave Budapest. I asked him: “How many years will you get?” He was cool as a cucumber and smiled broadly. “Listen”–he said–“my lawyers found something. If in any one of the EU countries I am acquitted of these charges then all EU states must accept the verdict and so I can travel again in Europe.” I asked him: “Will this trial take place in Hungary?” He said, “Yes.” So, I told him that this might mean two or three years. His answer was: “There will be a verdict by April.”  Next to him sat a character, a legal director, a puffed-up character, Ábel somebody or other [actually Ábel Galácz, director in charge of sales]. Hernádi turned to him and said, “Ábel, tell Jacek who will bring the suit.” Ábel told me that it is his own wife! Do you understand? Imagine such a situation. The wife is the plaintiff, comes the acquittal, and all is taken care of. Can you imagine something like that happening in Poland?” To which Karpinski added: “This is what Kaczyński is dreaming of in Poland.”

The dates seem to support his story. In the middle of December Krawieć with a large delegation did come to Budapest to conduct business negotiations with MOL. It was on December 6 that MOL announced that a former MOL employee and small investor had sued Hernádi for bribery, corruption and damages resulting therefrom. By January 11, Népszabadság reported that something was fishy about this suit and learned from international legal experts that if Hernádi wins, Croatia must drop the charges and withdraw the warrant issued by Interpol against Hernádi.

So, the suit was a clever charade as even the right-wing press suspected. A reporter for Heti Válasz told Hernádi point blank that “allegedly you move Ilona Bánhegyi [the plaintiff] in order to get an acquittal and the appeal is just part of the ‘game.'” To which Hernádi answered, “I don’t wish on anyone that half an hour I spent waiting for the verdict. Who would place one’s fate in the hands of a judge in such an uncertain and politically charged case? I am only the incidental victim of this story.” Ilona Bánhegyi is appealing the case. I wonder what the judge of the appellate court will say once he reads this story in the newspapers.

MOL’s CEO, the Croatian courts, and Viktor Orbán

It’s time to turn our attention to the woes of MOL, the Hungarian oil refining company, in Croatia where the company owns 49.1% of INA (Industrija Nafte), its Croatian equivalent, and has management rights. MOL acquired this holding in 2009.  A couple of years later, in the summer of 2011, the leading Croatian paper, Večernji list, reported that MOL’s CEO, Zsolt Hernádi, was accused by the Croatian prosecutor’s office of bribery in connection with the privatization of INA. According to the paper, Hernádi paid Ivo Sanader, Croatian prime minister at the time, €5 million for a favorable deal. As a result, MOL received a 47.47% stake in INA while the Croatian government held on to 44.85%. Sanader abruptly resigned on July 1, 2009 and fled to Austria from which he was eventually extradited. Following a long legal procedure he was sentenced to a ten-year jail term, which he is currently appealing.

Several times Croatian prosecutors tried to question Zsolt Hernádi, to no avail. Eventually the Hungarian prosecutors decided to investigate on their own but found no grounds for the charges. It is a long story, which I tried to summarize back in November 2012.

A few days ago the case took a much more serious turn. HVG reported already in July that the Croatian authorities planned to issue an international arrest warrant that would force the Hungarians to hand over Hernádi to the Croatian prosecutors. It took a little while, but on September 27 Hungarian papers reported that Hernádi’s picture is the first among several Hungarian nationals who are being sought by Interpol. Hernádi was supposed to appear at a Zagreb court on September 25 and, when he didn’t show, the judge ordered his arrest. Hungarian legal experts on international law, by the way, cannot decide whether or not Hungary is obliged to hand Hernádi over to the Croats.

It was at this point that Viktor Orbán decided to interfere. With that interference the longstanding feud between MOL and its business partner, the Croatian government, moved to a political level. The Hungarian government pointed out that “the developments of the past few days … made it clear to the [Hungarian] government that the dispute is no longer an economic conflict between co-owners and shareholders.” It noted that there is a concerted Croatian effort “to exert pressure [on MOL] outside the economic sphere.” The communiqué added that “these methods are unacceptable in the European Union and therefore Hungary cannot leave these measures unanswered.” For good measure the government cancelled Hungarian participation in a summit organized for October 3 in Dubrovik and asked MOL’s management to review the company’s portfolio and if necessary prepare the sale of its INA shares to the Croatian government or a third party. The cabinet also authorized “the Minister of Justice and the management of the Hungarian Asset Management company [that handles state assets] to examine what civil and criminal action would be possible to resolve the damages to MOL and Hungary.” Viktor Orbán showed that he is a tough guy who doesn’t allow anyone to treat an important Hungarian company this way.

The answer of Croatia’s prime minister, Zoran Milanovic, was conciliatory, but he pointed out that “Croatia’s government has no influence over the decisions taken by the country’s judicial bodies.” The Croatian president, Ivo Josipovic, was less charitable, saying that Orbán doesn’t seem to realize that Croatia is not Hungary where the government can instruct the judiciary.

Orbán is not changing his stance on the issue. Today during his usual Friday morning interview he reiterated that “coercion outside the economic realm does not make it possible and justified [for MOL] … to remain in the Croatian energy market.” He gave advice to the Croats: the state should get their energy sector back. Buy the MOL shares just as Hungary bought the gas storage facilities from E.On. That’s the civilized way, he added.

As far as the Croatian government is concerned, the solution is not that simple. According to Croatian papers, the government doesn’t have the €7.8 billion necessary to buy MOL’s stake at market value. But who else would be foolish enough to buy into INA given the murky purchase of the MOL stake? If it turns out that Hernádi is implicated, the entire original agreement of 2009 might be deemed null and void and the ownership of the MOL shares might be transferred to the Croatian government.

I’m also not at all sure whether MOL would consider selling its rather large holding in INA at this juncture. Apparently in the last three years the company invested a great deal of money into INA, and it is unlikely under the circumstances that MOL would receive a fair price for its stake. INA is a large chunk of MOL’s total wealth: about a third of all its assets. MOL’s importance as the region’s largest oil refinery would be jeopardized, especially if we consider Croatia’s access to harbors and pipelines necessary for MOL’s future expansion.

Orbán’s interference might also impact the price MOL can get for INA as a “state-ordered decision doesn’t bode well, even if selling the stake would be the economically reasonable step for MOL.” Meanwhile, MOL stock has dropped 4.6% in the past three days and is heading for its lowest close in sixteen months.

Sooner or later one will have to ask what actually happened in 2009 when MOL acquired its INA holding and its management. Until now no one in Hungary questioned Hernádi’s innocence, but lately there are more and more voices raising the issue of possible wrongdoing. As the argument goes, if Hernádi is innocent why isn’t he ready to face his accusers? Why does Viktor Orbán insist on MOL’s divesting its Croatian business? Is it perhaps because this way the Hungarian government hopes that the case against Hernádi will be dropped and therefore Hungary will not be obliged to extradite him to the Croatian authorities? There are just too many questions and at the moment no answers.

The latest nationalization plan: Dunaferr

Members of the Orbán government don’t like the word “nationalization.” To be precise, they don’t like the Hungarian word államosítás for nationalization. After all, they claim, the word államosítás can be used only for nationalization without compensation. As it happened after 1945 and especially after 1948. Today the state simply buys companies the government deems strategically important. Mind you, as usual the Orbán government doesn’t tell the whole truth about the recent nationalizations. After all, one of the first  moves of the Orbán government was the nationalization of public schools previously in the hands of the local communities. No one compensated them for their loss. The next step was the nationalization of hospitals. Again, no money exchanged hands.

This government seems to be enamored with the old socialist system of state ownership and centralization although they should be the first ones to realize its pitfalls, which eventually led to the total collapse of the socialist system. But I guess they think they can do better than those old party hacks. I don’t think that I’m alone in thinking that Orbán and his comrades are dead wrong.

I could go on and on listing companies, from MOL to E.ON and Rába, that have been taken over either in full or in part by the Hungarian state. E.ON cost the Hungarian taxpayers 870 million euros and MOL,1.88 billion euros. And now the Hungarian government has offered to buy the ISD DUNAFERR Company Group in Dunaújváros, which is one of the largest industrial firms in Hungary. The company is a diversified manufacturer of steel products. They produce hot rolled, pickled, cold rolled, galvanized strips and sheets, and hollow steel sections for engineering, automotive, and construction products as well as for the production of steel structures, household appliances, and other parts.

The company, owned early on by the Hungarian state, lost money year after year until the government managed to sell it to the Ukrainian Donbass Group in 2004. Later it was taken over by a Russian company. Eventually, the company became profitable but since the 2008-2009 financial crisis Dunaferr has suffered mightily. In an article that appeared on privatbankar.hu today one can see telling graphs of Dunaferr’s losses and debts.

A few days ago the company announced that because of its financial losses, it will have to let 1,500 workers go. Such a decision came at a very wrong time for the Orbán government. Dunaújváros plays a key role in the economy of Fejér County. We must also keep in mind that Viktor Orbán’s beloved Felcsút is also in Fejér County. Székesfehérvár, the first capital of Hungary, is the county seat and the city to which the Orbáns eventually moved and where the young Viktor went to high school. So, the whole issue has a personal aspect for Orbán as well.

On Monday morning Economics Minister Mihály Varga was dispatched to talk to the managers of Dunaferr in order to find a solution to the company’s problems. I assume Varga tried to convince the management of Dunaferr to postpone its decision to downsize its work force.  No buyout offer was discussed.

The decision to make an offer was reached hastily that same day during a cabinet meeting, which was conveniently and appropriately held in Székesfehérvár due to the August 20th celebrations.

Such quick decisions are typical of Viktor Orbán’s leadership style. I am certain that this particular decision, just like all the others, was the prime minister’s alone. Given the company’s dire financial straits it’s hard to imagine that no one in the cabinet raised doubts about the Hungarian state’s ability to take on another losing concern. But at these meetings Orbán is surrounded by yes-men; he doesn’t have to fear serious opposition. Perhaps at the meetings of the high brass of Fidesz there are men like László Kövér or even János Lázár who can have some influence over him, but such people don’t exist among the few ministers and the more numerous undersecretaries handpicked by the prime minister.

In the past it happened that the Hungarian state took over companies allegedly in order to prevent a loss of jobs and yet shortly after the nationalization the new owner, the Hungarian state, had to fire hundreds or even thousands of workers. In the case of Malév, the airline actually folded. It would be good to know whether the government has any business plan that would enable the company to continue employing its 7,500 workers and at the same time turn a profit.

I very much doubt that there is such a plan, so it is likely that sooner or later Dunaferr, this time as a concern owned by the Hungarian state, will have to let thousands of workers go. (Probably after the 2014 elections.) Meanwhile good money is being thrown after bad, as the saying goes. How long can all this go on, especially since only today I read that the deficit is on the rise again?

“The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” at a Fidesz-sponsored gathering in Slovakia

Every year Fidesz holds a “free university” in Tusnádfürdő-Bálványos, Romania. I normally write about the event because Viktor Orbán makes a regular appearance there and what he has to say is usually politically significant.

This Fidesz tradition has now been expanded. Between July 18 and 21 a similar “free university” was held for the first time in Martos (Martovce), a village of about 700 inhabitants, 17 km from Komárom/Komárno, Slovakia. Originally the organizers were hoping that Viktor Orbán would honor the event with his presence, but in the end they had to be satisfied with László Kövér as the keynote speaker.

The organizers received financial help from Fidesz and the Hungarian government in addition to MOL, which was described as the “chief sponsor.” Among the organizations that supported the effort were several Fidesz foundations, the Fidesz youth organization Fidelitas, the Association of the Young Christian Democrats, and János Sellye University in Komárno. The sponsors must have contributed quite a bit of money because the extended weekend event featured rock bands and singers as well as speakers from Serbia and Romania.

The host was Magyar Közösség Pártja (MKP) and Via Nova, its youth organization. Originally MKP was the only Hungarian political party in Slovakia, but it split a number of years ago. Béla Bugár, a moderate, left the party since it was moving farther to the right and established a Slovak-Hungarian party called Most-Híd, the Slovak and Hungarian words for “bridge.” Fidesz doesn’t want to build bridges. It is not their style, and in no time the Hungarian government announced that it doesn’t consider Most-Híd a Hungarian party. Currently, the Hungarian government has no connection with Bugár’s party even though at the last elections it managed to retain its status as a parliamentary party while the Fidesz-supported MKP did not. Fidesz often bets on the wrong horse when it comes to Hungarian minority politics in the neighboring countries.

Via Nova has a new chairman, László Gubík. A few months ago it became known that Jobbik had approached Gubík and urged closer cooperation between Jobbik and Via Nova. Gubík was apparently impressed by István Szávay, a Jobbik member of parliament and formerly head of the Jobbik-dominated student organization at ELTE’s Faculty of Arts. Gubík was photographed standing in front of a Jobbik flag. After the close cooperation between Jobbik and Via Nova was discovered, József Berényi, the chairman of MKP, tried to distance himself and his party from Jobbik, but according to inside information he didn’t manage to convince the leadership of Via Nova to abandon their connection with the extremist Jobbik. One can read more about the “independence” of Via Nova from MKP on an English-language Slovak site.

Despite this scandal, Fidesz didn’t hesitate to work together with Via Nova in the organization of the first “free university” in Slovakia. Apparently, the gathering was not a great success although a lot of “important” people showed up besides Kövér. Among them, András Schiffer (LMP); Katalin Szili, former socialist now independent MP; Hunor Kelemen, chairman of the largest Hungarian party in Romania; and Zsuzsanna Répássy, assistant undersecretary in charge of “national politics.” But these individuals as well as Fidesz must now live with the fact that racist, anti-Semitic, irredentist books were displayed and sold at the festival. Here is a picture of the collection. The picture is genuine; it can also been seen on a Slovak-Hungarian Facebook page.

Pick your favorite!

Among other titles you could buy Henry Ford’s The International Jew, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and Ernő Raffay’s openly anti-Semitic book on the Freemasons (Politizáló szabadkőművesség). Other choice titles on display were Borbála Obrusánszky’s Szkíta-magyar múltunk ragyogása, a book about the fallacy underlying the theory of the Finno-Ugric origins of the Hungarian language, and László Gulyás’s Küzdelem a Kárpát-medencéért (Struggle for the Carpathian Basin) in addition to a bunch of books by Albert Wass and József Nyirő. You can also see Viktor Orbán’s selected speeches.

Of course, this scandal highlights the fact that Fidesz is ready to work with groups that are closely associated with Jobbik in order to gain adherents. One might argue that the Fidesz bigwigs certainly couldn’t have had any knowledge of the kinds of books that would be displayed in Martos, but unfortunately this line of argumentation is weak because the Jobbik-Via Nova connection was already well known in March of this year. The Hungarian media first reported on the preparations for the festival on May 9, 2913. By that time at least Zsuzsanna Répássy, the assistant undersecretary in charge of Hungarian minority issues, must have known about the scandal in Slovakia concerning Via Nova. Yet, Fidesz pushed ahead, cooperating with this Jobbik-tainted youth organization.

Fidesz seems to be giving in to pressure coming from the far right in Romania too. The Tusnádfürdő-Bálványos event will take place this weekend. Originally a moderate right-of-center RMDSZ politician was supposed to be one of the speakers, but the small right-wing Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt (Transylvanian People’s Party) vetoed it. Therefore the politicians of RMDSZ will not attend.

There seems to be a tendency for Fidesz to drift farther and farther to the right in the neighboring countries. This is a self-defeating strategy. Both in Romania and in Slovakia the more moderate Hungarian parties are leading in the polls. And especially in Romania, Fidesz will need those votes come April 2014.

Meanwhile it will be difficult for Fidesz to explain away the display of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion at their first “free university” in Slovakia.

Sándor Csányi’s press conference

As Portfolio, the bilingual financial site, said today, “everybody was sitting on pins and needles” waiting for the cabinet decision on the fate of the loans issued in foreign currencies. However, it seems that the government wisely postponed the decision. So, for a while we will not know what kind of a solution the government will come up with.

An announcement of the decision at this point could have had an adverse effect on the financial and economic health of the country. Coming so soon after Sándor Csányi, the CEO of OTP, and some of the bank’s top officials sold millions of OTP shares, such an announcement might have further roiled the financial markets and would probably have had a negative effect on the value of the forint. As it was, the forint weakened, although not significantly, after the National Bank’s expected announcement that it would once again lower the interest rate, now down to 4%.

But there was another much awaited event, Sándor Csányi’s press conference after his return from an African safari. He managed to calm investors’ nerves; OTP closed up 4.7% today.

The press conference itself was quite unusual in that it was by invitation only. Let me first list the media outlets whose reporters were not invited: Kossuth Rádió, Magyar Televízió, Hír TV, Magyar Nemzet, HVG, and Index. Csányi invited TV2, ATV, Népszabadság, Origo, RTL Klub, and the Hungarian news agency MTI. As for the foreign press, reporters from Dow Jones, Bloomberg, and Reuters were present. In brief, the pro-government news outlets were pretty well ignored.

Sándor Csányi, the gracious host

First of all, Csányi made it patently clear that he has no intention of leaving his post as CEO of OTP. He made some references to Magyar Nemzet‘s false rumors about his health which he claimed is excellent. After all, he just walked 15 km in 40ºC in Africa. As to why he sold such a large number of OTP shares, Csányi partially stuck to his earlier explanation of his plans to open a large slaughter house in Mohács for which he needed capital. However, he admitted that since the value of OTP stock had been so volatile of late, he left word to sell if the shares fell to a certain price.

Csányi denied any intention “to send a message” to the prime minister via his stock sale. “I know Viktor Orbán. He doesn’t get scared easily.” Selling his stock would have no more effect on Orbán than attacking him with paper planes. He refused to see the government’s action as an attack on him personally or on his bank because, after all, OTP wasn’t handled any differently from the banking sector as a whole. On the other hand, he did make some malicious remarks about János Lázár, who recently attacked Csányi and his “empire,” comparing OTP to an octopus. He described it as a powerful organization with far-reaching tentacles that caused harm to the country as a whole. While claiming that these personal attacks don’t bother him, Csányi couldn’t help making a dig of his own. He told the reporters that he doesn’t know Lázár well, but people have told him that Lázár is a clever politician and a good organizer. He added, “We see how well he handled the tobacconist affair.”

But Lázár wasn’t the only target of his caustic remarks. Csányi expressed surprise at Magyar Nemzet’s decision to come out with the story of his heart operation only now when the owners of the paper, including Lajos Simicska, already knew all about his operation in February. Reporters naturally asked his opinion of the Orbán government’s decision to nationalize the 104 credit unions and inquired whether that would in any way adversely affect the interests of the banking sector. According to Csányi, the nationalization of the credit unions might actually benefit the banks. It is very possible that those who used to bank with the credit unions will move over to the commercial banks.

Otherwise he praised Zsolt Hernádi, CEO of MOL. Hernádi certainly needs every bit of help he can get at the moment because the old bribery charge against him has been revived. Croatian prosecutors accuse him of bribing Ivo Sanader, the former prime minister of Croatia, in order to obtain a majority share in INI, the Croatian oil company. Sanader is currently serving a ten-year sentence in Croatia. These accusations surfaced already in 2011 but the Hungarian prosecutor’s office refused to allow the Croats to question Hernádi. But Croatia’s efforts have intensified and now that it is part of the European Union it has a better chance of obtaining a European arrest warrant against Hernádi.

As for what will happen with the forex mortgages, the fear is that the government is thinking in terms of a “comprehensive” solution to the problem. That is, not only will those who are unable to pay their mortgages be offered some relief but everybody who ever took out a forex loan. That may mean, according to the calculation of  Index, 675,000 individuals. It’s no wonder that the government postponed the decision.

Nationalization Hungarian style

It is hard not to notice that the Orbán government is very fond of state ownership, especially in business sectors that they deem of “vital interest to the nation.” The first major venture of the Hungarian government was the purchase of a 21.1% share in MOL. It was a fantastic deal for the Russian company that owned these shares and a truly rotten one for the Hungarian government. As we discussed at the time, the Orbán government overpaid: 22,400 forints per share. Today the price is 16,350.

The next move was to buy out Rába Automotive Holding, whose stock is languishing on the Budapest Stock Exchange. This was followed shortly thereafter by the purchase of the German E-ON storage facilities. Again the price was too high according to people in the know.

So, one can ask,what is the Orbán government after? When we hear about the nationalization of private property, we tend to think of the kind that took place in 1948-49 when one day the store owner arrived to open up his small store only to be barred from entering. Surely, this kind of nationalization is out of the question today. If the state wants to have a greater share in the economy, it has to find more subtle ways of achieving its desired end.

Policy Agenda, an economic and political think-tank, estimates that up to date the Orbán government has spent more than three trillion Hungarian forints on purchasing or acquiring in one way or the other hitherto privately owned businesses. In most cases, at least outside of the energy sector, the state doesn’t actually want to own these companies. Rather, it wants to change the ownership structure of a particular business sector. In plain language, to take away from some in order to give to others.

Reaching hands / tmblr.com

One method is direct interference in the ownership of entire business sectors. The government is able by legal means to force current business owners to give up their businesses and sell them to others. The transfer in such cases is direct; the state is not an intermediary.

A good example of this type of state interference is the pharmacies. Soon after the Orbán government came into power the decision was reached that by a certain date all pharmacies must be owned by a practicing pharmacist working on the premises. Now it seems that relatively few employees want to buy their boss’s pharmacy although the government is offering loans. So for the time being the state will have to step in and assume “temporary” ownership.

Another example of direct transfer of ownership is the heavily criticized land lease program by which state-owned lands are distributed to people close to Fidesz and their relatives. By legal means the government can also achieve a transfer of ownership in the banking sector by demanding a minimum 50% Hungarian stake in all banks in the country.

A second method of ownership transfer is for the state to make a certain segment of the economy a monopoly. Cases in point: the monopolization of tobacco products or, earlier, of  slot machines. Here the state not only interferes with private property ownership but shuts down all activities connected to a market segment. The same thing happened to the so-called Elizabeth lunch vouchers, the issuance of which became a state monopoly. It’s no wonder that the European Commission objects to the practice.

A third method used by the Orbán government to achieve a change of ownership is price fixing. No one doubts that a government has the right to adjust tax laws, but when it also decides the final price of the product the owners of the enterprise might be forced to sell because of financial pressures. The much lauded mandatory lowering of utility prices is a good example of this method.

A fourth method of ownership transfer occurs when the central government takes over the responsibilities of the municipalities and consequently their business activities. This is what happened in the case of schools and hospitals. The municipalities now own the buildings and therefore are responsible for their maintenance but the activities within these buildings are supervised by the central government.

I doubt that we’ve seen the end of the state’s expansion into the domestic economy. If tobacco products could be made a monopoly why not have national liquor stores? I’m also certain that casinos are on the list. Perhaps the transfer of Margaret Island from District XIII to the City of Budapest is the first step in building a state casino on the island.

A final note on the French Suez  Environment  Co. that was part owner of Pécs’s water company. You may recall that shortly after Zsolt Páva, the new Fidesz mayor, took office in 2009 security officers in the dead of night locked out the employees of Suez and the city forcibly took over the company. The head of the company couldn’t even enter the building. Suez naturally sued. It was only a few days ago that Páva proudly announced that they settled with Suez for 7.5 billion forints instead of the 10 billion (34  million euros) originally demanded by Suez. The central government will take over part of the obligation.  Meanwhile the price of water has gone up substantially and local MSZP officials claim that investors cannot be convinced to come to Pécs. They all remember the fate of Suez. Currently unemployment in the city is 13%, well above the national average.

Who ever said that governments were great entrepreneurs?